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ARTICLE
TAX PENALTIES AND TAX COMPLIANCE
MICHAEL DORAN*
This Article examines the relationship between tax penalties and tax compliance.
Conventional accounts, drawing from deterrence theory and norms theory, as-
sume that the relationship is purely instrumental—that the function of tax penal-
ties is solely to promote tax compliance. This Article identifies another aspect of
the relationship that generally has been overlooked by the existing literature: the
function of tax penalties in defining tax compliance. Tax penalties determine the
standards of conduct that satisfy a taxpayer’s obligations to the government;
they distinguish compliant taxpayers from non-compliant taxpayers. This Article
argues that tax compliance in a self-assessment system should require the tax-
payer to report her tax liabilities only on the basis of legal positions that she
reasonably and in good faith believes to be correct. But the accuracy penalties
provided under current law set much lower standards of conduct. In the case of
a non-abusive transaction, current law allows the taxpayer to base her self-
assessment on a position having as little as a one-in-five chance in prevailing.
For an abusive transaction, the taxpayer only needs a reasonable belief that her
position is more likely than not to prevail. The Article describes reformed stan-
dards of conduct for taxpayers, tax practitioners, and government officials that
define tax compliance more appropriately for a self-assessment system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Why does government impose penalties on those who do not pay taxes?
Taxation, however legitimate, constitutes a forced extraction of wealth: why
then does government extract one amount from those who pay in the first
instance but a larger amount from those who do not? The conventional an-
swer is that a penalty promotes compliance. But even if one reasonably takes
it as given that government wants taxpayers to comply with their tax obliga-
tions, this simply raises the further question why government would expect
tax penalties to promote compliance. After all, if a taxpayer does not comply
with an obligation to pay a tax, it is not immediately obvious that the impo-
sition of a tax penalty—in effect, a second tax—will cause her to pay both
the tax and the penalty.
The justification for tax penalties would appear to turn on what moti-
vates taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations. The existing literature
presents competing models in response to that question. The standard deter-
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rence model holds that taxpayers comply with their tax obligations to avoid
legal sanctions (such as penalties and incarceration) whenever those sanc-
tions are expected to be more costly than compliance.1 The norms model
maintains that many taxpayers satisfy their tax obligations because they
want to adhere to specific social or personal norms, such as reciprocating the
cooperation of others or respecting legitimate obligations.2 Neither model
accounts adequately for taxpayer compliance, and, to complicate matters, the
two models suggest different roles for tax penalties. The deterrence model,
following the familiar economic analysis of punishment, implies that tax
penalties should be severe enough that taxpayers expect the costs of non-
compliance to exceed the costs of compliance. That argues for a substantial
increase in expected tax penalties over those set out in current law. The
norms model, by contrast, implies that harsh tax penalties may undermine
compliance—for example, by signaling that many taxpayers shirk their obli-
gations or by crowding out personal commitments to comply. The model
argues for deemphasizing tax penalties in favor of other government actions
that enhance trust in government and respect for legal obligations.
The questions of why taxpayers comply and how tax penalties should
be structured to promote compliance have taken on immediate policy impor-
tance over the last several years as legislators and tax administrators have
rediscovered the “tax gap,” the difference between what taxpayers actually
owe and what taxpayers actually pay.3 Current estimates put the annual tax
gap at $345 billion.4 This imposing figure has raised a bipartisan ruckus
among lawmakers eager to reduce the federal budget deficit without having
to cast difficult votes to increase taxes, reform entitlement programs, or de-
crease discretionary spending. It appears hardly relevant that the other side
of the tax gap is a robust taxpayer compliance rate of about eighty-five per-
cent5 or that, because of enforcement costs, optimal tax administration al-
most certainly would permit an appreciable level of taxpayer non-
1 See infra Part III.A.
2 See infra Part III.B.
3 See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REDUCING THE
FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE (2007). There, the
government defines the tax gap as “the aggregate amount of true tax liability imposed by law
for a given tax year that is not paid voluntarily and timely.” Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
4 OFF. OF TAX POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR
REDUCING THE TAX GAP 5 (2006). The number falls to $290 billion once administrative en-
forcement and collection efforts are taken into account. Id. The tax gap has been a recurring
theme of tax policy. The latest round of interest was triggered by the publication in 2005 of
new tax-gap figures for tax year 2001; these updated figures from the late 1980s. See Press
Release, Internal Revenue Serv., New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate IR-
2005-38 (Mar. 29, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,ID=137247,00.
HTML. The 2005 preliminary figures were finalized in 2006. See OFF. OF TAX POL’Y, supra, at
5.
5 The government puts the compliance rate between 83.7% (when late payments and gov-
ernment enforcement actions are not taken into account) and 86.3% (when late payments and
government enforcement actions are taken into account). OFF. OF TAX POL’Y, supra note 4, at
5.
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compliance.6 Policymakers regard the tax gap as a pressing problem, and
they respond in part by ratcheting up penalties.7
The increased attention to tax penalties raises the potential for legisla-
tive mischief. In fairness, the two competing models of taxpayer compli-
ance—the deterrence model and the norms model—pull policymakers in
different directions on penalty reform. There is, however, an absolutely cru-
cial function of tax penalties that the legal and economic literatures generally
have failed to recognize: the fundamental role of tax penalties in defining tax
compliance. Our self-assessment tax system looks to taxpayers in the first
instance to determine their own tax liabilities. Tax penalties set boundaries
around the conduct that constitutes compliance with this duty of self-assess-
ment so that taxpayers who want to comply—whether to avoid legal sanc-
tions or to satisfy social or personal norms—will know how to do so.
This definitional function of tax penalties implies that a primary consid-
eration in structuring penalties should be to conform the standards of con-
duct set by the penalties to the basic objectives of the self-assessment tax
system. But policymakers consistently have failed to account for this. Cur-
rent penalties set forth multiple standards of conduct, none of which coheres
with the policy commitment to the self-assessment tax system. Academics
too have failed to account for the dual relationship of tax penalties and tax
compliance. In both the legal and economic literatures, analysis of tax com-
pliance focuses almost exclusively on the familiar instrumental function of
tax penalties with little or no attention to the definitional function. Conse-
quently, most proposals for penalty reform would impose inappropriate stan-
dards of conduct on taxpayers.
The analysis of this Article yields three principal conclusions. First, in
addition to their instrumental function of promoting tax compliance, tax pen-
alties serve the critical, transparent, but generally overlooked function of
defining tax compliance. This definitional function should be the starting
point for penalty reform: before one can figure out how to promote compli-
ance, one must first determine what conduct will count as compliance. Sec-
ond, in a self-assessment system, the concept of tax compliance that tax
penalties define should consist of nothing less and nothing more than the
taxpayer’s best effort to assess her tax liabilities correctly. Third, consistent
with this concept of tax compliance, current tax penalties should be revised
to impose standards of conduct on taxpayers, tax practitioners, and govern-
ment officials that are generally higher than those imposed by current law.
The argument for these conclusions proceeds as follows. Part II provides a
6 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforce-
ment of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 70 (2000) (“Optimal enforcement tends to be char-
acterized by some degree of underdeterrence relative to first-best behavior, because allowing
some underdeterrence conserves enforcement resources.”).
7 See, e.g., American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 812, 818–19,
118 Stat. 1418, 1577–80, 1584–85 (codified at I.R.C. § 6662A (2006)) (enacting higher penal-
ties for abusive transactions).
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brief overview of the relevant tax penalties under current law. Part III ex-
plores the two functions of tax penalties: the instrumental function generally
recognized by the conventional deterrence and norms models and the defini-
tional function generally overlooked by the existing literature. Part IV sets
out the case for reforming current tax penalties. The discussion there shows
where the instrumental and definitional functions described in Part III con-
verge on penalty reform, where they diverge on penalty reform, and why the
definitional function should be the first consideration.
II. OVERVIEW OF TAX PENALTIES
The federal income tax imposes three basic obligations on the taxpayer:
to assess her own tax liability, to file a tax return reporting that liability, and
to pay that liability when due.8 A complex scheme of civil and criminal
penalties stands behind those obligations.9 The tax code provides, for exam-
ple, penalties for failure to file a tax return10 and penalties (and interest
charges) for failure to pay a tax liability when it is due.11 The taxpayer’s
duties to file and to pay are straightforward, and the operation of the associ-
ated penalties is not problematic.12 By contrast, the taxpayer’s duty of self-
assessment is as obscure and controversial as the substantive tax law. The
penalty that grounds that duty—referred to here as the “accuracy penalty”—
presents difficult problems of interpretation and administration; it is the prin-
8 See OFF. OF TAX POL’Y, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PEN-
ALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 18 (1999) [hereinafter
TREASURY STUDY]; COMMISSIONER’S EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE ON CIVIL PENALTIES, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES 1 (1989) [hereinafter COMMISSIONER’S
TASK FORCE REPORT].
9 The Treasury Department reported in 1999 that the tax law “presently contains over 100
civil and criminal penalties.” TREASURY STUDY, supra note 8, at 19. Additionally, there are
many provisions in the tax code, such as the excise tax on large “golden parachute” payments
to corporate managers, that function as penalties without being denoted as such. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 4980B(C) (tax on group health plans that fail to provide “COBRA” coverage to
former plan participants); § 4999 (tax on “excess parachute payment”). The arguments for and
against considering these provisions to be penalties are discussed in TREASURY STUDY, supra
note 8, at 13–14. For a skeptical analysis of such provisions, see Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via
Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1989).
10 I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (civil penalty for failure to file return); § 7203 (criminal penalty for
willful failure to file return).
11 Id. § 6651(a)(2) (civil penalty for failure to pay tax shown as due on return);
§ 6651(a)(3) (civil penalty for failure to pay tax required to be shown as due, but not shown as
due, on return); § 7203 (criminal penalty for willful failure to pay tax).
12 The fact that those penalties are mechanically straightforward does not imply that they
could not be improved as a policy matter. See, e.g., TREASURY STUDY, supra note 8, at 59–74;
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTER-
EST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUC-
TURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX
SHELTERS) 123–28 (1999) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY].
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cipal focus of this Article.13 Further, the taxpayer’s duty of self-assessment
necessarily implicates the actions of tax practitioners who assist the taxpayer
and government officials who administer the tax code. Analysis of the accu-
racy penalty therefore must include analysis of the corresponding penalties
applicable to those parties. This Part sets out the standards of conduct and
the penalties imposed on taxpayers, tax practitioners, and government offi-
cials—all within the context of the taxpayer’s duty to assess her own tax
liability.
A. Standards of Conduct and Penalties for Taxpayers
At the threshold, the taxpayer’s duty of self-assessment flatly precludes
the taxpayer lying on her tax return. If the taxpayer does lie about her tax
liability, she exposes herself to a civil fraud penalty equal to seventy-five
percent of her fraudulent underpayment14 and possible criminal sanctions.15
But the self-assessment duty entails more than merely avoiding dishonesty;
it also requires some level of accuracy. That presents difficulties when the
application of the tax law is uncertain. In those cases, the standards of con-
duct required of the taxpayer are determined by the accuracy penalty. The
penalty distinguishes between transactions that do and do not have the po-
tential for tax abuse.
1. Non-Abusive Transactions
A non-abusive transaction is any transaction other than one that, be-
cause of its potential for tax abuse, constitutes either a “reportable transac-
tion”16 or a “tax shelter.”17 For a non-abusive transaction involving a
“substantial understatement of income tax,”18 the accuracy penalty equals
twenty percent of the understatement.19 Thus, if a taxpayer has understated
13 The penalties set out in I.R.C. §§ 6662 and 6662A are technically labeled “accuracy-
related” penalties. For ease of reference, this Article refers to those penalties, collectively, as
the “accuracy penalty.”
14 I.R.C. § 6663(a) (2006).
15 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7207.
16 As used here, the term “reportable transaction” means any transaction covered by
I.R.C. § 6662A—that is, either a reportable transaction described in § 6707A(c)(1) or a listed
transaction described in § 6707A(c)(2). See infra Part II.A.2.
17 As used here, the term “tax shelter” means any transaction described in I.R.C.
§ 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii). See infra Part II.A.2.
18 An “understatement” of tax is the difference between the tax required to be shown on
the taxpayer’s return and the tax actually shown on her return, and the understatement is “sub-
stantial” if it exceeds a designated threshold. For most taxpayers, the threshold is the greater of
$5,000 or one-tenth of the tax required to be shown on the return. I.R.C. § 6662(d). In the case
of most corporations, the threshold is $10,000,000 or, if less, the greater of $10,000 or one-
tenth of the tax required to be shown on the taxpayer’s return. Id. No accuracy penalty applies
for an understatement that does not meet the designated substantiality threshold.
19 I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2). The taxpayer may also owe interest for late payment of the tax. See
§ 6601.
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her taxes by $100,000 and she incurs the accuracy penalty, her liability to
the government for the tax and penalty will total $120,000.20 The statutory
conditions for imposing the accuracy penalty, however, are very forgiving.
Even if a taxpayer has substantially understated her tax liability, she will not
incur the accuracy penalty if her understatement is attributable either to a
disclosed legal position that has a “reasonable basis” or to a non-disclosed
legal position that has “substantial authority.”21
Consider first the defense for an understatement attributable to a dis-
closed position having a reasonable basis. The disclosure requirement is
mechanical; the taxpayer must simply include the proper factual information
on the proper form filed with her return.22 To have a reasonable basis, the
taxpayer’s legal position must be stronger than “frivolous” or “patently im-
proper,” but it need not be correct or even likely correct.23 As interpreted by
both the government and the practicing bar, a taxpayer has a reasonable
basis if her position stands just a one-in-five chance of prevailing on the
merits.24 Thus, in deciding to exclude an item from gross income or to claim
a deduction where there is legal uncertainty, the taxpayer will incur no accu-
racy penalty if there is even a twenty-percent chance that a court will uphold
the exclusion or deduction and if she makes proper disclosure to the govern-
ment on her return. She may know that the legal uncertainty on the matter is
very significant. She may in fact believe—and her tax advisors may have
counseled her—that the law plainly favors the government. However, even
her sincere belief that her position would likely lose in court is beside the
point. To defeat the accuracy penalty, all she needs beyond disclosure is a
one-in-five chance of winning.
Alternatively, the taxpayer can avoid the accuracy penalty without
making any disclosure to the government if her legal position has substantial
authority. This approach has the obvious attraction for the taxpayer of not
20 See I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006). A similar penalty attaches (in an equal or greater amount)
to certain misstatements concerning the value of assets and liabilities and to negligence or
disregard of rules or regulations. See § 6662(b)(1), (3)-(5). The penalty for valuation misstate-
ments arises only in specific contexts (such as misstating pension liabilities). See generally
Richard J. Wood, Accuracy-Related Penalties: A Question of Values, 76 IOWA L. REV. 309
(1991). The penalty for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations sets a low standard of
taxpayer conduct: to incur this penalty, the taxpayer must have failed “to make a reasonable
attempt to comply” with the tax law or to have engaged in “careless, reckless, or intentional
disregard” of the tax law. I.R.C. § 6662(c); see also TREASURY STUDY, supra note 8, at 100.
Similarly, a separate penalty for making “frivolous” submissions to the government sets a low
standard of conduct. See I.R.C. § 6702.
21 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B). The taxpayer may also defeat the penalty if she has “reasonable
cause” for the understatement and acts “in good faith.” § 6664(c)(1). This generally looks to
the taxpayer’s effort to assess her tax liability properly and potentially excuses an “honest
misunderstanding of . . . law.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2008). The reasonable-basis and
substantial-authority standards generally are more favorable to the taxpayer than the reasona-
ble-cause-and-good-faith standard; the latter is discussed in Part II.A.2, infra.
22 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(e)–(f).
23 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).
24 See JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 160.
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increasing the chance that the government will scrutinize her return. The
substantial-authority standard requires that the weight of the legal authority
for her position be “substantial” relative to the weight of the legal authority
against her position.25 For practical purposes, the substantial-authority stan-
dard requires that the taxpayer have about a two-in-five chance of prevailing
in litigation on the merits.26 Again, the fact that the taxpayer may have a
sincerely held belief that her position will likely lose in court is irrelevant in
determining that her position is supported by substantial authority and there-
fore protected from the accuracy penalty.
2. Potentially Abusive Transactions
The accuracy penalty sets a higher standard of conduct for a taxpayer
engaging in a potentially abusive transaction. These transactions divide into
three categories: tax shelters, disclosed reportable transactions, and non-dis-
closed reportable transactions. The first two categories are subject to one
standard; the third category is subject to a higher standard, although the
higher standard effectively attaches only to the taxpayer’s failure to disclose
the underlying transaction.27
a. Tax Shelters and Disclosed Reportable Transactions
A taxpayer is subject to the accuracy penalty for any substantial under-
statement of income tax attributable to a tax shelter.28 For this purpose, a
“tax shelter” is any entity, plan, or arrangement having the avoidance or
evasion of income tax as a “significant purpose.”29 The accuracy penalty in
the case of a tax shelter is twenty percent of the understatement, but the only
defense available is acting with reasonable cause and in good faith.30 This
defense depends on all relevant facts and circumstances, the most important
of which is the “extent of the taxpayer’s effort to assess the taxpayer’s proper
tax liability.”31 The taxpayer establishes reasonable cause and good faith if
she shows both that she had substantial authority for her position and that
she reasonably believed that her position was more likely than not correct.32
The first component, substantial authority, is the same as before: the tax-
payer must have a forty-percent chance of prevailing in litigation on the
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
26 See JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 160.
27 Michael Graetz suggested this point.
28 The standard here for “substantial understatement” is the same as that in the case of a
non-abusive transaction. See supra note 18.
29 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) (2006).
30 I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1). The taxpayer cannot assert either the substantial-authority or the
reasonable-basis defense available for non-abusive transactions. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i). However,
as shown below, the existence of substantial authority for the taxpayer’s position is a compo-
nent of the reasonable-cause-and-good-faith defense.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2008).
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f).
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merits.33 The second component, a reasonable belief that her position is more
likely than not correct, requires that the taxpayer reasonably believe that her
position has a greater than fifty-percent chance of prevailing in litigation on
the merits.34
The twenty-percent accuracy penalty also applies when a taxpayer en-
gages in a reportable transaction that she discloses to the government.35 A
“reportable transaction” is a transaction that the government specifically
identifies as involving tax avoidance or evasion or as having potential for tax
avoidance or evasion.36 As in the case of a tax shelter, the taxpayer’s sole
defense in the case of a disclosed reportable transaction is reasonable cause
and good faith.37 Again, the taxpayer will establish reasonable cause and
good faith if her tax position is supported by substantial authority and if she
reasonably believes that the position is more likely than not correct.38
b. Non-Disclosed Reportable Transactions
In the case of a non-disclosed reportable transaction, the accuracy pen-
alty applies on a strict-liability basis.39 The penalty equals thirty percent of
the taxpayer’s reportable transaction understatement.40 The taxpayer with
such an understatement cannot assert any defense to the penalty.41 Thus,
even if the taxpayer sincerely believes that her position is correct, she will
incur the thirty-percent penalty if the position fails on the merits. The tax-
payer triggers this strict-liability standard simply by failing to disclose a re-
portable transaction.
33 See JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 160.
34 See id. at 150. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has adopted the more-likely-
than-not standard as the basis for requiring corporations to recognize tax effects for purposes
of their financial statements. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB Interpre-
tation No. 48: Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (2006).
35 I.R.C. § 6662A (2006). The penalty equals twenty percent of the taxpayer’s “reportable
transaction understatement.” § 6662A(a). This understatement is, roughly, the amount of un-
derstated tax attributable to the reportable transaction. § 6662A(b)(1). There is no substantial-
ity threshold for this penalty. § 6662A.
36 More precisely, the accuracy penalty under I.R.C. § 6662A applies to any “listed trans-
action” and to any “reportable transaction (other than a listed transaction) if a significant
purpose of such transaction is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.”
§ 6662A(b)(2). A “listed transaction” is a “reportable transaction” that is the same as or sub-
stantially similar to a transaction specifically identified by the government as a tax-avoidance
transaction. §§ 6662A(d), 6707A(c)(2). A “reportable transaction” is a transaction for which
the government requires disclosure because it is “of a type” that the government “determines
as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.” §§ 6662A(d), 6707A(c)(1). Thus, the
penalty under § 6662A potentially applies to any listed transaction and to any other reportable
transaction if (in addition to its potential for tax avoidance or evasion) the reportable transac-
tion has a “significant purpose” of avoiding or evading federal income tax.
37 I.R.C. § 6664(d) (2006).
38 Id.
39 I.R.C. §§ 6662A, 6664(d).
40 I.R.C. § 6662A(c).
41 I.R.C. § 6664(d).
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These standards of conduct imposed on the taxpayer by the accuracy
penalty are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT UNDER THE ACCURACY PENALTY
Transaction Type Standard of Taxpayer Conduct
Non-abusive, disclosed 20% chance of winning on merits (“reasonable
basis”)
Non-abusive, non-disclosed 40% chance of winning on merits (“substantial
authority”)
Tax shelter 40% chance of winning on merits plus a reasonable
belief of a greater than 50% chance of winning on
merits (“substantial authority” plus “reasonable belief
that more likely than not”)
Reportable, disclosed 40% chance of winning on merits plus a reasonable
belief of a greater than 50% chance of winning on
merits (“substantial authority” plus “reasonable belief
that more likely than not”)
Reportable, non-disclosed Strict liability
B. Standards of Conduct and Penalties for Tax Practitioners
Many taxpayers rely on tax practitioners, including attorneys and ac-
countants, in assessing and reporting their tax liabilities. Current law im-
poses standards of conduct, supported by penalties, on these practitioners.
The standards and penalties divide into three broad categories of practitioner
activity: providing advice, preparing returns, and promoting transactions.42
1. Tax Advisors
One of the principal functions of a tax practitioner is to advise the tax-
payer about the application of the tax law to her circumstances. The stan-
dards of conduct imposed on the tax advisor are set out in a set of
government regulations known as “Circular 230.”43 Circular 230 provides
42 The focus in this Part, like the focus throughout this Article, is on the assessment and
reporting of tax liabilities. For this reason, the important function of the tax practitioner as the
taxpayer’s advocate in audit and litigation and the penalties applicable to the practitioner in that
capacity are ignored.
43 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0–10.93 (2007). Standards promulgated by practitioner organizations
(such as the bar and accountant organizations) also apply to the conduct of tax advisors in
many cases. However, those standards generally do not provide specific rules for tax advisors
qua tax advisors. For a discussion of the applicable bar standards, see Linda M. Beale, Tax
Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privi-
leges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 626–33 (2006). For criticism of how those standards have been
applied to lawyers rendering tax advice, see Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggres-
sive Return Advice, 9 VA. TAX REV. 77, 80–89, 93–96 (1989). For a discussion of the applica-
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both generally applicable and specific standards for rendering certain types
of written tax advice. The government may sanction a tax advisor who vio-
lates these standards by disbarring or suspending the advisor from practice
before the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) or by censuring or fining the
advisor.44
The general standards include broad requirements of candor, diligence,
and good conduct,45 but they impose no specific duty to advise the taxpayer
about the strength of a position that the taxpayer takes on a particular issue.
The two general rules that bear specifically on providing tax advice set rela-
tively low standards of conduct. First, if the tax advisor provides written
advice to a taxpayer, the advisor must meet certain minimum standards
aimed at ensuring the integrity of the advice.46 Second, if the tax advisor
knows that the taxpayer has not complied with the tax law or has made an
error or omission in any document prepared under the tax law, the advisor
must advise the taxpayer of the fact and consequences of the non-compli-
ance, error, or omission.47
Higher standards apply when the tax advisor provides the taxpayer with
written advice that constitutes a “covered opinion,” which includes advice
about a transaction that presents a particular potential for tax abuse and ad-
vice about a tax shelter that the taxpayer will rely on for purposes of the
accuracy penalty.48 These standards generally require that the tax advisor
develop the relevant facts, apply the tax law to the facts, and state a conclu-
sion as to the likelihood that the taxpayer will prevail on the merits for each
issue addressed by the opinion.49 If the advisor is unable to conclude that the
taxpayer is more likely than not to prevail on the merits (that is, that the
taxpayer has a greater than fifty-percent likelihood of winning in litigation),
the opinion must indicate both that fact and the fact that the opinion cannot
be used by the taxpayer in defense against the accuracy penalty.50
ble standards in the accounting profession, see Harold S. Peckron, Watchdogs That Failed to
Bark: Standards of Tax Review After Enron, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 851, 867–69 (2002).
44 31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (2007).
45 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.20 (providing documents and certain other information to the
government); § 10.22 (exercising due diligence); § 10.27 (not charging “an unconscionable
fee”); § 10.29 (avoiding conflicts of interest); § 10.28 (providing documents and certain other
information to the taxpayer); § 10.51 (not engaging in incompetent or disreputable conduct).
46 31 C.F.R. § 10.37. More specifically, the advisor may not base the advice on unreason-
able factual or legal assumptions, may not unreasonably rely on representations, statements,
findings, or agreements, must consider all relevant facts that the advisor knows or should
know, and must not take into account the possibility that the taxpayer’s return will not be
audited, that an issue will not be raised on audit, or that an issue will be resolved through
settlement. Id.
47 31 C.F.R. § 10.21.
48 31 C.F.R. § 10.35.
49 Id.
50 Id; see also Beale, supra note 43, at 583, 618–26.
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2. Tax Return Preparers
The tax code imposes a standard of conduct on a tax return preparer
that tracks the standard imposed on the taxpayer herself.51 As revised in
2008, the penalty applies to a tax return preparer for any understatement of
the taxpayer’s liability attributable to a disclosed position for which there
was no reasonable basis or to an undisclosed position for which there was no
substantial authority.52 This standard is consistent with the standard imposed
on the taxpayer under the accuracy penalty for non-abusive transactions. The
return preparer penalty also applies to an understatement on the taxpayer’s
return if the underlying transaction was a tax shelter or a reportable transac-
tion, there was not substantial authority for the taxpayer’s position, and it
was not reasonable to believe that the taxpayer’s position was more likely
than not to prevail on the merits.53 This is consistent with the standard im-
posed on the taxpayer for tax shelters and disclosed reportable transactions.
3. Promoters
Tax advisors and return preparers provide services to taxpayers on an
individualized basis. Other practitioners, whether or not members of a pro-
fession, also potentially affect how taxpayers comply with their tax obliga-
tions by providing more generalized services. Most commonly, these
practitioners are promoters of transactions or investment products; they
range from financial institutions selling tax-qualified retirement plans to in-
vestment banks and financial advisors selling corporate and individual tax
shelters. A promoter penalty, equal to the smaller of $1,000 and the pro-
moter’s fee, covers anyone who organizes or sells an interest in an entity,
plan, or arrangement but only if she makes a statement about the tax benefits
of the entity, plan, or arrangement that she “knows or has reason to know is
false or fraudulent as to any material matter.”54 Thus, the penalty sanctions
51 The term “income tax return preparer” is defined generally to include anyone who
prepares a return or refund claim or a “substantial portion” of a return or refund claim for
compensation. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36) (2006). As interpreted by the government, this definition
encompasses advice provided to a taxpayer about the potential treatment of a transaction on
her return. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15 (2008). Thus, the distinction between a tax return
preparer and a non-preparer tax advisor can be elusive.
52 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3880 (2008) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2)(A)-(B)).
53 I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2)(C). The return preparer can assert as a defense that there was rea-
sonable cause for the understatement and that the preparer acted in good faith. See
§ 6694(a)(3). Return preparers face additional statutory penalties. See, e.g., § 6694(b) (a pen-
alty for any understatement on the taxpayer’s return if the return preparer’s conduct constituted
a willful attempt to understate the liability or a reckless or intentional disregard of the law);
§ 6695 (penalties for acts such as failing to sign the taxpayer’s return and failing to provide a
copy of the return to the taxpayer); § 6701 (a penalty on aiding, assisting, procuring, or advis-
ing with respect to an understatement of tax liability); § 6713 (a penalty for disclosing tax-
payer information).
54 I.R.C. § 6700(a).
122 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 46
only outright lying about the tax benefits of the promoter’s transaction or
product.
C. Standards of Conduct and Penalties for Government Officials
Although government officials plainly have an important role in the
assessment of a taxpayer’s liabilities, the tax law imposes very little account-
ability on those officials for inaccurate assertions of liability for taxes and
penalties. The only specific check against government officials is a statutory
provision permitting the award of costs to a taxpayer who prevails in an
administrative or judicial tax dispute with the government.55 However, those
costs may be awarded only if the position taken by the government in the
dispute was not “substantially justified.”56 That standard requires nothing
more than that the government have a one-in-five chance of prevailing on
the merits—the same low standard applicable under the accuracy penalty to
a taxpayer who discloses a non-abusive transaction.57
III. THE DUAL FUNCTION OF TAX PENALTIES
Tax penalties serve two functions. First, they serve the instrumental
function of promoting tax compliance. This is widely recognized in the legal
and economics literatures, although there is little consensus about how pen-
alties promote compliance beyond the basic point that different penalty
structures may affect compliance differently. Second, tax penalties serve the
function of defining tax compliance. This definitional function has been gen-
erally ignored by the legal and economic literatures, but it is absolutely fun-
damental. The policy commitment to a self-assessment tax system implies a
particular conception of tax compliance, and the penalties for taxpayers, tax
practitioners, and government officials should transcribe that conception into
appropriate standards of conduct. If tax penalties set out the wrong concep-
tion of tax compliance, those penalties—even if well designed for instru-
mental purposes—will not induce conduct that conforms to the right
conception of tax compliance. The wrong target remains the wrong target,
no matter how expert the marksmanship.
This Part examines both the instrumental and the definitional functions
of tax penalties. Subpart A discusses the two competing models of tax penal-
55 I.R.C. § 7430. There are, of course, more general prohibitions on misconduct by gov-
ernment officials set forth in government ethics rules and, to the extent the officials are mem-
bers of a professional organization (such as the bar), in the rules of that organization. For a
discussion of standards, not backed by specific sanctions, for government officials in determin-
ing what issues to pursue against taxpayers, see Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid
Agency: Achieving the Proper Balance in Enforcing the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON
TAX J. 1 (2008) (discussing standards set forth in Revenue Procedure 64-22).
56 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(i) (2006).
57 Compare 26 C.F.R. § 301.7430-5(c) (2008) with I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) and JOINT
COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 160.
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ties as instruments for promoting tax compliance, considers the specific pen-
alty reform implications of the two models, and identifies certain of their
limitations and shortcomings. Both models generally assume that the consid-
erations they set out are sufficient for guiding tax penalty reform, but that
assumption is simply wrong. Subpart B considers the definitional function of
tax penalties. Subpart C considers the relationship between the instrumental
function and the definitional function.
A. The Instrumental Function of Tax Penalties
Most analysis of the instrumental function of tax penalties begins with
the reasonable supposition that, because penalties promote tax compliance,
penalty reform requires an understanding of what motivates taxpayers to
comply with their tax obligations. That immediately presents a puzzle: tax-
payers generally pay their taxes, and conventional economic analysis cannot
account for that fact.58 All the fury in Congress over the tax gap obscures the
point that most taxpayers pay “most of their taxes most of the time,” and
many pay all their taxes all the time.59 Although the estimated $345 billion
tax gap is significant, the overall compliance rate is about eighty-five per-
cent.60 The fact that taxpayers in a self-assessment system voluntarily remit
about eighty-five percent of the amount required by law indicates that tax-
payer compliance is robust.
While policymakers wring their hands over how to collect the remain-
ing fifteen percent of tax liabilities without turning the republic into a police
state,61 academics have struggled to account for the high percentage that tax-
payers already pay. The extensive but still unsettled literature coalesces
around two principal models of taxpayer compliance: a deterrence model
and a norms model. Neither of these explanations has managed to account
fully and persuasively for the high level of observed taxpayer compliance,62
and they both entail dubious prescriptions for tax penalty reform.
58 See James Alm, Isabel Sanchez & Ana de Juan, Economic and Noneconomic Factors in
Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3 (1995).
59 Id.
60 The terms “tax compliance” and “compliance” are defined more precisely in Part III.B.
For purposes of this Part III.A, the use of those terms is provisional and should be understood
roughly as a taxpayer paying the tax she owes at the time she owes it.
61 See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, Narrowing Tax Gap Called “Unrealistic”: Paulson’s Com-
ments Anger Democrats, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, at D3.
62 As Joel Slemrod notes, “there is still much dispute about the proper conceptual model
to use in addressing” tax compliance. Joel Slemrod, Introduction to WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES:
TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 1, 2 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
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1. The Deterrence Model
The deterrence model draws directly from Gary Becker’s economic
analysis of punishment for criminal conduct.63 Becker’s analysis is norma-
tive; his purpose is to determine optimal punishments by setting a wrong-
doer’s expected costs equal to the wrongdoer’s expected benefits.64 Becker
models expected costs as a function of both the severity of the punishment
potentially imposed on the wrongdoer and the probability of punishment.65
That implies that the level of punishment and the probability of punishment
generally are substitutes.66 If all else is held constant, a less severe punish-
ment with a higher probability of imposition can yield the same expected
costs to the wrongdoer—and, therefore, the same level of deterrence—as a
more severe punishment with a lower probability of imposition.
Becker’s general model (which he thought applicable to a broad range
of wrongdoing, from traffic violations to murder67) has been adapted specifi-
cally for the problem of tax evasion by Michael Allingham and Agnar
Sandmo.68 Allingham and Sandmo analyze evasion by considering the tax-
payer’s decision of how much income to report on her tax return while treat-
ing both the taxpayer’s income and the government’s enforcement strategy as
exogenous.69 They argue that the taxpayer will evade tax to the extent that
the benefit of evasion (the amount of tax not paid) exceeds the product of the
total amount she would have to pay if her evasion were detected (the tax
plus any penalty) and the probability of detection.70 Again, this implies that
penalties and probabilities can be traded off in deterring tax evasion: if, for
example, a desired level of deterrence could be achieved with a fifty-percent
probability of the taxpayer incurring a penalty equal to forty percent of the
amount evaded, the same level of deterrence could be achieved with a
twenty-five-percent probability of the taxpayer incurring an eighty-percent
63 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968). For criticism of Becker’s analysis, see, e.g., Nicholas Stern, On the Economic
Theory of Policy Towards Crime, in ECONOMIC MODELS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 123 (J.M.
Heineke ed., 1978).
64 Becker, supra note 63, at 170, 176.
65 Id. at 177.
66 Id. at 177–84.
67 Id. at 170.
68 Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,
1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972); see also Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A
Theoretical Analysis, 3 J. PUB. ECON. 201 (1974).
69 Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 68, at 323–24. In focusing on the taxpayer’s deliber-
ate underreporting of income, Allingham and Sandmo follow the familiar but elusive distinc-
tion between tax evasion (illegal non-reporting of income or non-payment of taxes) and tax
avoidance (legal structuring of conduct to avoid incurring tax obligations). Not too much
should be made of the distinction, however: in the end, the difference between non-compliance
that is avoidance and non-compliance that is evasion really is nothing more than the difference
between resolving an issue against the government under conditions of greater or lesser legal
uncertainty.
70 Id. at 326.
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penalty or a one-hundred-percent probability of the taxpayer incurring a
twenty-percent penalty.71
The subsequent literature has extended the Allingham-Sandmo analysis
to include adverse effects on the taxpayer’s reputation as expected costs,72 to
differentiate between individual and corporate taxpayers,73 to treat govern-
ment detection and enforcement activity as endogenous,74 and to apply to tax
avoidance,75 among other refinements.76 Throughout all the permutations, the
basic proposition of the model is that a taxpayer reports and remits her tax
liabilities to the extent that—and only to the extent that—her expected costs
of non-compliance exceed her expected benefits of non-compliance.
Tax penalties obviously are central to the deterrence model: they pro-
vide the mechanism for imposing higher costs on non-compliant taxpayers.
The deterrence model therefore implies that accuracy penalties should be
high and that, at least on certain interpretations of the model, taxpayers
should have strict liability for those penalties. Kyle Logue makes the case
clearly.77 In examining taxpayer compliance under conditions of legal uncer-
71 See id. at 330.
72 See, e.g., James P.F. Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to
Tax Evasion, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 797 (1989).
73 See, e.g., Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs,
89 J. PUB. ECON. 1593 (2005); Massimo Marrelli & Riccardo Martina, Tax Evasion and Strate-
gic Behaviour of the Firms, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 55 (1988); Eric M. Rice, The Corporate Tax
Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small Corporations, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra
note 62, at 125.
74 See Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, The Tax Compliance
Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1986). This
refinement complicates the implications of the deterrence model considerably. See James An-
dreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818,
841–43 (1998).
75 See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is
Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241 (2007); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance,
Evasion, and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1436–38 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). As a general proposition, the economic literature has
tended to focus on tax evasion, and the legal literature has tended to focus on tax avoidance.
There are, of course, counterexamples. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between
Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1454 n.1 (2003).
76 See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 74 (describing numerous extensions and refine-
ments of the Allingham-Sandmo analysis); Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of Tax Evasion: A
Retrospective View, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 643 (2005) (same); Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves:
The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2007) (same).
77 Logue, supra note 75; see also David P. Hariton, Response to ‘Old “Brine” in New
Bottles’ (New Brine in Old Bottles), 55 TAX L. REV. 397, 399 (2002) (arguing for strict-liability
penalty for abusive transactions); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths about Tax Shelters: The
Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 362
(2002) (same); Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response
to Corporate Tax Shelters, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229 (Wolfgang Scho¨n ed.,
2008) (arguing for strict-liability standards); Slemrod, supra note 76, at 43 (“[A] government
concerned with maximizing the expected utility of a representative citizen will want to set the
penalty for detected crimes as high as possible, so that even with a low resource cost of en-
forcement, the overall expected deterrent effect will be large.”). But see Sarah Lawsky, Proba-
bly? Understanding the Law’s Uncertainty 27 (GWU Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 422,
2008) (arguing that “fault-based penalties are not necessarily inconsistent with, and in fact
may be required by, marginal deterrence theory”). Without arguing for strict liability, Alex
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tainty, Logue posits a rational but amoral taxpayer.78 He argues that the opti-
mal level of compliance will be achieved by setting the penalty on non-
compliance to equal the quotient of the “harm” from non-compliance (the
understated tax liability) over the ex ante probability of detection, and by
imposing strict liability for that penalty.79 Strict liability forces the taxpayer,
when considering a transaction for which the tax treatment is uncertain, to
internalize the full cost of the harm from non-compliance.80 That, in turn,
causes the taxpayer to proceed with the transaction only where the post-tax
return, discounted for the possibility of the taxpayer losing on the tax issue,
remains positive.81
However, policymakers would be mistaken to attempt tax penalty re-
form by simply adopting the implications of the deterrence model. There are
significant limitations to the model, and there are good reasons to be hesitant
about its policy prescriptions. Most importantly, the model fails to explain
the current high level of actual taxpayer compliance.82 Assuming that a non-
compliant taxpayer does not engage in criminal misconduct, the largest pen-
alty that she can expect is a seventy-five-percent fraud penalty;83 more
likely, the penalty would only be a twenty-percent or thirty-percent accuracy
penalty.84 The general probability that the government will detect the tax-
payer’s non-compliance is low; the government audits fewer than two per-
cent of the tax returns filed each year by individuals.85 Assuming a
Raskolnikov suggests the desirability of increasing probabilities of detection. Alex Ras-
kolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Pen-
alty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006); see also Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery: The
Role of Penalties in the U.S. Tax Law in the Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holding v. United
States, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 381 (2006) (arguing for an increase in probability of detection
through greater government enforcement activity).
78 Logue, supra note 75, at 244–45, 247–51.
79 Id. at 266–68. The “penalty” in Logue’s formulation includes both the understated taxes
and the additional amount representing what current law would call the accuracy penalty. Id. at
267. Logue’s argument is a particular application of the general analysis of punitive damages.
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869, 887–96 (1998) (demonstrating that, where there is some probability that
injurer will escape liability, “total damages imposed on an injurer should equal the harm mul-
tiplied by the reciprocal of the probability that the injurer will be found liable when he ought to
be”). Logue does not argue that this conclusion holds under all conditions, and he notes that,
when his assumptions are relaxed, there is a basis for preferring a fault-based penalty regime.
Logue, supra note 75, at 290–93. In fact, the policy choice between strict liability and fault-
based standards may be quite complicated. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 50–56, 70.
80 See Logue, supra note 75, at 267, 278–79. Relatedly, if there were “detection certainty”
in every case, no penalty would be necessary to cause the taxpayers to internalize this cost. Id.
at 261.
81 See id. at 267–68.
82 See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 74, at 819; Raskolnikov, supra note 77, at 577;
Sandmo, supra note 76, at 649–50.
83 I.R.C. § 6663 (2006).
84 I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6662A.
85 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS’ AUDIT AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT RATES FOR
INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS ACROSS THE COUNTRY 3 (1998). In 2007, the government audited
only 1.03% of individual tax returns and only 0.66% of business tax returns. INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2007 IRS ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE STATISTICS 3, 6 (2007), avail-
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maximum penalty of seventy-five percent and an average detection rate of
two percent,86 a taxpayer’s expected cost of avoiding a $100 tax liability
would be only $3.50—an amount far less than the $100 expected cost of
paying the tax liability up front.87 Assuming a maximum penalty of twenty
percent and the same rate of detection, the taxpayer’s expected cost of avoid-
ing a $100 tax liability would be only $2.40.88 If the deterrence model were
correct—that is, if taxpayers comply with their tax obligations only to avoid
penalties that make non-compliance more costly than compliance—taxpay-
ers generally would not pay all the taxes they owe.89 The deterrence model
thus substantially under-predicts taxpayer compliance.90
It is possible that taxpayers so overestimate the likelihood of detection
by the government that even the modest penalty levels under current law
yield expected costs more likely to deter non-compliance.91 But this seems
able at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/irs_enforcement_and_service_tables_fy_2007.pdf. Of
course, selection of a return for audit by no means ensures that the government will detect
every position on the return that potentially merits an adjustment to tax or a tax penalty. In
fiscal year 1995, only 4.1% of audited taxpayers—already a very small percentage of total
returns—“received any penalty for fraud, negligence, false withholding, failure to report tips,
or other miscellaneous infractions.” Andreoni et al., supra note 74, at 821; see also James S.
Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old ‘Brine’ in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135,
160–61 (2002) (arguing for greater enforcement of existing accuracy penalty).
86 The two-percent rate, derived from the overall audit rate, is used only for illustration. In
fact, the detection rate varies with different types of tax return items. For example, if a tax-
payer fails to report as income all or part of the taxable compensation reported by her em-
ployer on Form W-2, the detection rate would be much higher—approaching one hundred
percent in certain cases.
87 The expected cost of non-compliance under these assumptions is straightforward: $100
(tax liability) + $75 (tax penalty) = $175 (total potential liability); $175 x 0.02 (probability of
detection) = $3.50 (expected cost of non-compliance).
88 The calculation here is: $100 (tax liability) + $20 (tax penalty) = $120 (total potential
liability); $120 x 0.02 (probability of detection) = $2.40 (expected cost of non-compliance).
89 Cf. Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and
Fantasy, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 355, 358 (1985) (arguing that, in cases of legal uncertainty, the
deterrence theory suggests that “throughout the 1970s no one should have paid the taxes they
owed” (emphasis in original)).
90 Andreoni et al., supra note 74, at 855 (“The most significant discrepancy that has been
documented between the standard economic model of compliance and real-world compliance
behavior is that the theoretical model greatly over-predicts noncompliance.”).
91 See, e.g., James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Why Do People Pay
Taxes?, 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21, 24 (1992); Andreoni et al., supra note 74, at 844 (“[S]urvey
results suggest that people greatly overestimate the probability of an IRS audit.”); Sandmo,
supra note 76, at 649; John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The
Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 J. AM. POL. SCI. 490, 491 (1995). Still, the effects
of audit rates on compliance are uncertain. Some have found that “higher probabilities of
taxpayer audits and larger numbers of notices sent to taxpayers . . . are associated with higher
levels of voluntary compliance by taxpayers.” Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, The Effect
of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual
Income Tax, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 1, 7 (1985); see also Alm et al., supra note 58, at 12. By contrast,
in a “controlled experiment” conducted by the Minnesota Department of Revenue, letters sent
by the government to taxpayers indicating that their next returns would be “closely examined”
appear to have caused compliance to increase among low- and moderate-income taxpayers but
to decrease among high-income taxpayers. Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Chris-
tian, Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled
Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455, 456–57 (2001); see also STEPHEN COLEMAN,
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unlikely. In the case of the seventy-five-percent penalty for fraud, the tax-
payer would have to assume a better than one-in-two chance of detection for
the model to yield an accurate compliance prediction.92 In the case of the
twenty-percent penalty, the taxpayer would have to assume a better than a
four-in-five chance of detection.93 With published audit rates of less than two
percent, one would have to posit general paranoia among taxpayers to rescue
the model on this basis.94
Predictions under the deterrence model might be more satisfactory if
expected costs were increased by reputational harm and similar non-pecuni-
ary costs,95 but this also presents problems. Taxpayer information—includ-
ing even the existence of an audit—remains confidential up to the point that
the taxpayer and the government take their dispute to adjudication.96 Crimi-
nal tax prosecutions are rare,97 and civil tax disputes can always be settled
THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 10–16 (1996),
available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4827/.
92 For the expected cost of non-compliance to be the same as the expected cost of compli-
ance, the probability of detection would have to be 57.15 percent: $100 (tax liability) + $75
(tax penalty) = $175 (total potential liability); $175 x 0.5715 (probability of detection) =
$100 (expected cost of non-compliance).
93 For the expected cost of non-compliance to be the same as the expected cost of compli-
ance, the probability of detection would have to be 83.34 percent: $100 (tax liability) + $20
(tax penalty) = $120 (total potential liability); $120 x 0.8334 (probability of detection) =
$100 (expected cost of non-compliance).
94 Taxpayer compliance is lowest for income types that are subject neither to “withholding
[nor] third-party information reporting.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 85, at 12; see
also Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLI-
ANCE, VOLUME 2: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 76–125 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz
eds., 1989); Slemrod, supra note 76, at 39. This certainly provides some support for the deter-
rence model, Slemrod, supra note 76, at 37, 45, but still leaves unexplained why there is
significant compliance for such income. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 12
(indicating compliance rate of over forty percent for such income). Slemrod argues that the
high compliance rates associated with wages and salaries reflect the very high likelihood of
detection for a taxpayer who underreports that type of income and that this vindicates the
deterrence model. Id. at 39; see also Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed
IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 974 (2003). But that argument is not fully satisfactory. Taxpay-
ers with readily observable items, such as wages and salaries, can shift their non-compliance
efforts to less observable items, such as deductions, credits, and income not subject to report-
ing or withholding. So, for example, a taxpayer with both wage and non-wage income could
increase non-compliance on the non-wage side to compensate for forgone non-compliance on
the wage side; alternatively, the taxpayer could overstate deductions or credits. Although re-
porting and withholding on specific items decrease opportunities for non-compliance, they do
not eliminate those opportunities altogether.
95 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 72, at 8; see also 1 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: AN AGENDA
FOR RESEARCH 7–8 (Jeffrey A. Roth et al. eds., 1989); Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott,
Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2
J. ECON. PSYCH. 213, 227 (1982). Non-reputational but still non-pecuniary costs, such as “anx-
iety, guilt or a reduction in self-image” attributable to an “honesty characteristic,” Gordon,
supra note 72, at 798–99, are considered in the discussion of the norms model in Part III.A.2,
infra.
96 I.R.C. § 6103 (2006).
97 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., supra note 85, at 4. In a nation of 300 million people, the
government recommended only 1,423 criminal tax prosecutions in 2007. Id. at 10.
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confidentially prior to litigation.98 The likelihood of suffering involuntary
reputational harm for non-compliance is, if anything, even more remote than
the likelihood of paying penalties.99
A substantial part of the deterrence model’s weakness derives from its
narrow view of taxpayer motivation. The model assumes that tax-compli-
ance decisions are made by rational taxpayers who simply compare expected
benefits to expected costs.100 But that fails to conform to general intuitions
about taxpayer motivations or to reflect evidence from the social sciences
about the importance of other motivations for legal compliance.101 Consider
two polar cases. At one pole, certain taxpayers no doubt comply with their
tax obligations simply for the sake of complying; they are unmoved by pen-
alty threats because, for them, obeying the law is an end in itself.102 At the
other pole, certain taxpayers no doubt would refuse to comply with their tax
obligations even if non-compliance were made very costly.103 Between the
simple cases of taxpayers who always comply and taxpayers who never
comply, there are no doubt many taxpayers with rich and complex motiva-
98 That is, the taxpayer who wants to avoid adverse personal publicity could always pay
the full amount demanded by the government.
99 The deterrence model also makes the dubious assumption that a taxpayer can determine
the expected cost of non-compliance. This would require her to know both the terms of the
applicable penalties and the probability that those penalties will be imposed in her case. The
first point is plausible in the case of a sophisticated taxpayer, but the second point is not
plausible in any case. The probability that a penalty will be imposed on a taxpayer is itself a
“cumulative probability” of various detection, enforcement, and litigation outcomes—with
only the general audit rate available as a fixed datum. Raskolnikov, supra note 77, at 581.
These include the probabilities “that an offense will be detected; that it will be selected for
prosecution; that the government will prevail at trial on the substantive issue, decide to seek a
penalty and convince a court to impose it; that the judgments favoring the government will
survive appeals; and, finally, that the government will actually collect the penalty from the
taxpayer.” Id. Many taxpayers presumably use the published audit rate, which is very low, as a
rough approximation of the actual probability that a penalty would be imposed.
100 See, e.g., Commission on Taxpayer Compliance, American Bar Association, Report
and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW. 329, 348–49 (1987) (criticizing
deterrence model for embodying “an overly narrow view of taxpayers as purely rational calcu-
lators who evaluate the potential costs and benefits of noncompliance in making their tax
decisions”).
101 See infra Part III.A.2; see also Alm et al., supra note 58, at 15 (“[E]xplaining tax
compliance requires recognizing the myriad factors that motivate individual behavior, factors
that go much beyond the standard economics-of-crime approach . . . .”); Andreoni et al., supra
note 74, at 819 (“Economists are just beginning to grapple with the findings from other social
sciences that could explain the observed compliance levels, such as a household’s sense of
moral or social obligation to pay its taxes.”).
102 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); cf. Graetz et al., supra
note 74, at 7 (identifying taxpayers who are “habitual compliers”).
103 One need not think only of tax protestors here. In the early 1980s, Raymond
Hunthausen, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, announced that he would stop paying
one-half his federal tax liability to protest the federal government’s military spending. Check-
ing Up on ‘Dutch’, TIME, Nov. 28, 1983; Joseph Sobran, Bishop in the Doghouse, NAT’L REV.,
Dec. 19, 1986, at 28. He actively sought publicity for his non-compliance. Indeed, he certainly
understood that his action could have its intended effect only to the extent that both the public
and the government were aware that he was refusing to comply with his tax obligations for
purposes of dissent.
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tions for compliance and non-compliance; but the deterrence model gener-
ally assumes the richness and complexity away.104
Finally, the implications of the deterrence model for penalty reform
give pause.105 The model clearly implies that either penalty levels or
probabilities of detection (or a combination, given the substitutability of the
two) should be raised to high levels. If a rough probability of detection were
set at twenty-five percent (which is more than ten times the general audit
rate of two percent), the accuracy penalty would have to be raised to 300%
in order to make the expected cost of non-compliance equal to the expected
benefit of non-compliance.106 There is good reason to suppose that a penalty
of that magnitude would be unacceptable on political (and likely other)
grounds.107 The current penalty for civil tax fraud is only seventy-five per-
cent, and the most recent legislative increase in the accuracy penalty raised
the stakes by only ten percentage points.108
If, instead, existing penalty levels are taken as given, government could
increase the probability of imposing the penalties. However, this likely
would require very intrusive detection efforts and extremely aggressive and
costly enforcement. Government could, for example, undertake to audit four
out of every five tax returns and commit to conducting those audits as thor-
oughly as possible. In so doing, the probability of penalty imposition would
increase, perhaps enough to make the twenty-percent accuracy penalty a
meaningful deterrent. But it seems likely that few legislators would be will-
104 Compare Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 75, at 1446 (“In the typical economic
model, . . . there are no honest or dishonest individuals, only utility-maximizers; thus, this
distinction can be introduced only artificially by simply positing that some individuals do not
pursue tax evasion.”), with Dick J. Hessing, Henk Elffers, Henry S.J. Robben & Paul Webley,
Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Stud-
ies and Experimental Studies, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 62, at 291, 304 (positing
three groups of taxpayers—“taxpayers who never evade taxes[;] . . . taxpayers who will try to
evade now and then; and . . . taxpayers who will often try to evade”—and arguing that deter-
rence is not needed for the first group and is ineffective for the second and third groups).
105 The discussion here considers only the penalty levels and probabilities of detection
implied by the deterrence model. See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 34–35.
The standard of taxpayer conduct—which, as Logue, supra note 75, and Shaviro, supra note
77, argue, should be strict liability—is considered in Part IV.A, infra.
106 If the taxpayer did not report $100 of income and faced a twenty-five percent chance of
being made to pay the $100 of income and a $300 penalty, the expected cost to the taxpayer of
not reporting the $100 would be $100 [0.25 x ($100 + $300)], which is equal to the expected
cost of reporting the $100 in the first instance.
107 As Graetz and Wilde put the point: “[t]hat an economic model analyzing the expected
utility calculation of a would-be tax evader recommends large increases in the applicable sanc-
tion in light of the very low probability of its application quickly becomes irrelevant as a
policy matter. . . . [L]ife imprisonment is simply not within the feasible set of punishments for
tax evasion.” Graetz & Wilde, supra note 89, at 358.
108 American Jobs Creation Act of 2006, Pub. L. 108-357, § 812(a) (2006) (codified at
I.R.C. § 6662A (2006)) (raising the accuracy penalty in the case of non-disclosed reportable
transactions).
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ing to allocate the necessary resources to the IRS and that fewer still would
find that degree of government intrusiveness to be tolerable.109
2. The Norms Model
The norms model maintains that a substantial number of taxpayers
comply with their tax obligations through adherence to social or personal
norms.110 The model positions itself as a complement to the deterrence
model: it accepts that the deterrence model accounts for some taxpayer com-
pliance, but it argues that the compliance left unexplained by the deterrence
model can be attributed to standards of conduct imposed on taxpayers by
others or by themselves. Consider social norms first.111 The argument here is
not that a taxpayer complies with her tax obligations because she fears for-
mal sanctions (such as tax penalties) potentially imposed by the government;
rather, she complies because she follows social norms, and she wants to
avoid informal sanctions potentially imposed by other taxpayers.112 The
model points in particular to social norms of reciprocal cooperation and trust
as drivers of tax compliance.113 For example, taxpayers may comply as a way
109 Raskolnikov’s proposal for a “self-adjusting” penalty, intended to increase the likeli-
hood of the government detecting tax avoidance, helps illustrate the counterintuitive policy
implications of the deterrence model. He argues that taxpayers who attempt to avoid taxes
often do so by concealing improperly claimed items (such as deductions and credits) among
properly claimed items of the same type. He therefore proposes a penalty that would be calcu-
lated as a percentage not of the improperly claimed item but of the properly claimed item.
Raskolnikov, supra note 77, at 599–605. Assume, for example, that taxpayer A improperly
claims $100 of charitable deductions and properly claims $200 of charitable deductions; as-
sume that taxpayer B also improperly claims $100 of charitable deductions but has no properly
claimed charitable deductions. In that case, taxpayer A—but not taxpayer B—would incur
Raskolnikov’s self-adjusting penalty. In other words, Raskolnikov’s proposal effectively bur-
dens the combination of compliance and non-compliance more heavily than it burdens non-
compliance alone. For any given level of non-compliance, the self-adjusting penalty increases
as the taxpayer’s compliance increases.
110 See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recom-
mendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 612–17 (2007).
111 For general discussions of social norms, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMER-
GENCE OF NORMS (1977); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic
Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and
Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The
New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). For an argument that social norms can support
taxpayer non-compliance, see Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Un-
derstandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601 (2007).
112 See, e.g., 1 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH, supra note 95, at 73;
Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 612–17; Slemrod, supra note 76, at 39.
113 See LARS P. FELD & BRUNO S. FREY, TAX COMPLIANCE AS THE RESULT OF A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL TAX CONTRACT: THE ROLE OF INCENTIVES AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2005)
[hereinafter PSYCHOLOGICAL TAX CONTRACT]; Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale
and Conditional Cooperation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 136 (2007); Lederman, supra note 75, at
1476–1517; John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Adaptive Political Attitudes: Duty, Trust, and Fear
as Monitors of Tax Policy, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 903 (1998); John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell,
Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI.
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of inducing or reciprocating the compliance of other taxpayers.114 The argu-
ment is similar as to personal norms. A taxpayer who values integrity, hon-
esty, and the benefits of citizenship may feel guilt, shame, or similar
emotions if she does not meet her tax obligations.115 These personal norms
may depend on whether she regards her tax obligations as legitimate. That,
in turn, may depend on whether she sees legal actors, such as government
tax officials, satisfying basic concerns of procedural justice such as “neutral-
ity, lack of bias, honesty, efforts to be fair, politeness, and respect for citi-
zens’ rights.”116
398 (1998) [hereinafter Trust and Taxpaying]; Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Posi-
tive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 62, at 225–26;
M.W. Spicer & S.B. Lundstedt, Understanding Tax Evasion, 31 PUB. FIN. 295 (1976). On
norms of cooperation and reciprocity more generally, see Jon Elster, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY:
A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 97-151, 186–214 (1989); Cristina Bicchieri, Norms of Coopera-
tion, 100 ETHICS 838 (1990); Ernst Fehr & Simon Ga¨chter, Fairness and Retaliation: The
Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (2000); Mark Lubell & John T. Scholz,
Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 160 (2001);
Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137
(2000).
114 Dan Kahan’s account is representative. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity:
Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003) [hereinafter Logic of Reci-
procity]. He argues that individuals generally approach collective-action problems, such as tax
compliance, as reciprocal cooperators rather than as free riders. Id. at 71. That is, “[w]hen
they perceive that others are behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by honor, altru-
ism, and like dispositions to contribute to public goods even without the inducement of mate-
rial incentives.” Id. But when “they perceive that others are shirking or otherwise taking
advantage of them, individuals are moved by resentment and pride to withhold their own
cooperation and even to engage in personally costly forms of retaliation.” Id. Tax compliance,
then, is a cooperative norm providing an equilibrium solution for the problematic funding of
public goods: a taxpayer pays her taxes in order to reciprocate the compliance of other taxpay-
ers, to induce the compliance of other taxpayers, or both. If she knows that other taxpayers are
refusing to comply, she will not feel constrained by the norm to continue her own compliance.
See also Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1513, 1514, 1519–20 (2002) [hereinafter Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community
Policing]; Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 340–44
(2001).
115 See, e.g., PSYCHOLOGICAL TAX CONTRACT, supra note 113; Lars P. Feld & Bruno S.
Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated, 3 ECON. GOV. 87 (2000); Bruno S. Frey
& Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis (CESifo Working
Paper No. 760 2002) [hereinafter Deterrence and Morale in Taxation]; Frey & Torgler, supra
note 113; Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 612–17; Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On
Legal Sanctions, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 274 (1967); Young-dahl Song & Tinsley E. Yarbrough,
Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 442 (1978). Recently, the
literature has begun to use the vague term “tax morale” to describe an individual taxpayer’s
intrinsic willingness to comply with her tax obligations. See Frey & Feld, supra, at 6; Frey &
Torgler, supra note 113, at 140; Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 601. The term, however, is also
used more expansively to include both social and personal norms. Kornhauser, supra note 110,
at 606–07.
116 TYLER, supra note 102, at 7; cf. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). A separate strand of the norms literature suggests that
taxpayers comply to the extent that they perceive the terms of their exchange with the govern-
ment—paying taxes on the one hand and receiving public goods on the other—to be fair. See,
e.g., Massimo Bordignon, A Fairness Approach to Income Tax Evasion, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 345
(1993); Spicer & Lundstedt, supra note 113, at 296. That line of analysis generally makes the
highly implausible assumptions that “the taxpayer can compute the ‘fair’ terms of trade” be-
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The norms model implies that government should supplement tax pen-
alties with other mechanisms aimed at inducing and reinforcing norms-based
compliance. Tax penalties remain necessary under the model for two rea-
sons. First, the norms model assumes that certain taxpayers will not follow
tax-compliance norms, and those taxpayers must be deterred by the threat of
legal sanctions. Second, taxpayers who do follow such norms must be as-
sured that non-compliant taxpayers will be sanctioned; otherwise, the tax-
compliance norms may atrophy.117 But government must find a delicate bal-
ance because heavy reliance on penalties may crowd out norms.118 This im-
plies that government must somehow devise “appropriately tailored”
penalties “aimed specifically” at taxpayers who ignore tax-compliance
norms.119 Penalty reform under the norms model, then, would make tax pen-
alties both narrower and stronger: narrower because they must target only
recalcitrant, norm-defying taxpayers and stronger because, under the deter-
rence model, existing penalties are too low to provide an effective deterrent.
With respect to taxpayers who follow tax-compliance norms, the objec-
tive of government should be different.120 Government should aim, for exam-
ple, to cultivate trust among taxpayers that their compliance will not be
exploited by other taxpayers.121 This may include publicizing the fact that
most taxpayers comply with their tax obligations122 and not publicizing crim-
inal tax prosecutions.123 Government also should emphasize procedural jus-
tice: officials responsible for enforcing tax laws should deal with taxpayers
tween herself and the government and that the taxpayer believes that she has accurate percep-
tions of the extent to which other taxpayers comply. Bordignon, supra, at 346, 350–51; see
also JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 32 n.67 (arguing that the benefits of govern-
ment services are too diffuse for individuals to directly correlate them with paying their taxes).
Additionally, this analysis struggles to account for compliance with redistributive taxes. Deter-
rence and Morale in Taxation, supra note 115, at 13–14.
117 See Deterrence and Morale in Taxation, supra note 115, at 11; Lederman, supra note
75, at 1470–77.
118 Deterrence and Morale in Taxation, supra note 115, at 7 (arguing that “authoritarian”
government approach may “crowd out” compliance based on tax morale but that a “respect-
ful” government approach may “crowd in” such compliance); see also Bruno S. Frey, A Con-
stitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 1043, 1050–52 (1997); Ostrom,
supra note 113, at 147. But see Lederman, supra note 75, at 1499. On the other hand, it may be
that such norms actually ground the deterrence effects of tax penalties. See Scholz & Pinney,
supra note 91, at 491. If so, scaling back tax penalties may have undesirable effects under both
the deterrence and the norms models.
119 Logic of Reciprocity, supra note 114, at 79; see also Lederman, supra note 75, at 1514.
120 For an extended discussion of the policy implications of the norms-based model, see
Kornhauser, supra note 110, at 626–40.
121 See Logic of Reciprocity, supra note 114, at 76.
122 Id. at 83. Experimental evidence, however, suggests that such measures have only mi-
nor effects on taxpayer compliance. See, e.g., Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel
Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experi-
ment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125 (2001); see also Coleman, supra note 91, at 18, 25.
But see Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 115, at 295, 299.
123 Logic of Reciprocity, supra note 114, at 83; see also Schwartz & Orleans, supra note
115, at 291, 300; Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire?
Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note
62, at 195.
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openly and fairly, without bias or predisposition; and government should
“give taxpayers the benefit of the doubt when it finds a mistake, by sanc-
tioning small violations more mildly, and by sanctioning large . . . violations
more heavily.”124
There are, however, problems both with the policy implications of the
norms model and with the model itself. Government, the model implies,
should direct separate enforcement strategies at separate groups of taxpay-
ers—targeting deterrence-based penalties at taxpayers who do not follow
tax-compliance norms and norm-enhancing measures at taxpayers who do.
But that makes a critical move that the norms model has yet to justify: the
move from establishing the existence of different taxpayer motivations to
establishing the existence of different taxpayer types. The former does not
necessarily imply the latter.125 An individual may defy tax-compliance
norms, but that hardly implies that she disregards all social or personal
norms, including those that support compliance with other legal obliga-
tions.126 A taxpayer may even be motivated by deterrence as to some of her
tax obligations but by norms as to other tax obligations; or she may have
different motivations as to different items within the four corners of a single
tax return. More subtly, it may well be that a taxpayer’s motivations are
mixed as to almost every point of tax compliance and non-compliance; that
is, it may be that some combination of deterrence and norms is necessary for
her to comply on any particular tax issue, with neither alone being
sufficient.127
124 Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Fi-
nance 20 (CLEO Research Paper No. C04-22, 2004) (describing policy recommendations of
“tax morale” literature). Australia attempted to implement such an approach for its tax system.
See generally TAXING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION (Valerie
Braithwaite ed., 2003).
125 But see Graetz et al., supra note 74, at 7 (distinguishing between “strategic noncom-
pliers” and “habitual compliers”); Alex Raskolnikov, Beyond Deterrence: Targeting Tax En-
forcement with a Penalty Default, 109 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (distinguishing
between “reciprocators” and “gamers”); Michael Wenzel, The Multiplicity of Taxpayer Identi-
ties and Their Implications for Tax Ethics, 29 LAW & POL’Y 31 (2007) (providing empirical
evidence for links between posited taxpayer “identities” and “tax ethics”).
126 See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REV. 1821,
1822 (2000) (“[O]ne might argue that people are able to compartmentalize their behaviors
and that I might be cooperative in some contexts and not in others. So I might always take the
trouble to vote, I might always remember to repay small debts, and I might be invariably
generous in my dealings with others—but I might shade my taxes. This is surely a correct view
of our complexity much of the time.”).
127 See, e.g., 1 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH, supra note 95, at 5
(“Research to date tends to support tax administrators’ long-held conjectures that financial
incentives, social sanctions, and moral commitment may all affect taxpayer compliance
. . . .”); Raskolnikov, supra note 77, at 579 (recognizing that taxpayers consider “various
factors” in making compliance decisions); see also Ostrom, supra note 113, at 138. But see
Alm et al., supra note 58, at 15 (“There are individuals who always cheat and those who
always comply, some who maximize expected utility, others who overweight low probabili-
ties, individuals who respond in different ways to changes in their tax burdens, some who are
at times cooperative and at other times free-riders, and many who are guided in some way by
social norms.”); Hessing et al., supra note 104, at 304 (positing separate taxpayer types).
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The policy prescriptions of the norms model elide these nuances; they
take it as given that certain taxpayers respond to tax-compliance norms but
that other taxpayers respond to deterrence.128 The norms model, then, as-
sumes that the only implementation question is how to tailor different gov-
ernment strategies to different groups of taxpayers: harsh tax penalties
appropriate for taxpayers who respond only to deterrence should not be
aimed at taxpayers who respond to tax-compliance norms because the harsh
penalties will undercut the norms and crowd out compliance; measures in-
tended to enhance taxpayer trust should not be aimed at taxpayers who re-
spond only to deterrence because those measures will signal easy
opportunities for avoidance and evasion. But if most (or even many) taxpay-
ers in fact have mixed and complicated motivations for compliance, the pol-
icy approaches recommended by the norms model seem as likely to
undermine tax compliance as to support it.
Apart from its policy implications, there are fundamental problems with
the norms model itself. Application of the rich literature on social norms to
tax compliance encounters the basic difficulty that, unlike other activities
that can be regulated through social norms, tax compliance and tax non-
compliance are private matters that third parties, other than government offi-
cials, simply cannot observe. Individuals complete their tax returns privately
(with or without the help of a tax-return preparer, although the information
provided to the preparer is also confidential129), and taxpayers file their re-
turns subject to strict confidentiality laws that prohibit government officials
from disclosing taxpayer information.130 With the exception of those who
hold or seek high public office, very few taxpayers make their returns availa-
ble for public review.
But a social norm generally presupposes observability by third parties
because it “represents a pattern of behavior that is judged in a similar way
by others and that is sustained in part by social approval or disapproval.”131
A social norm of trust among reciprocal cooperators, for example, requires
“face-to-face assurance,”132 which makes the insightful trust and reciprocity
128 See Lederman, supra note 75, at 1500.
129 I.R.C. § 6713 (2006).
130 I.R.C. § 6103.
131 Alm et al., supra note 58, at 6; see also Fehr & Ga¨chter, supra note 113, at 166 (defin-
ing a social norm as “a behavioral regularity; that is . . . based on a socially shared belief of
how one ought to behave; which triggers . . . the enforcement of the prescribed behavior by
informal social sanctions”); Sunstein, supra note 111, at 915 (“[S]ocial norms are enforced
through social sanctions . . . .”).
132 Logic of Reciprocity, supra note 114, at 76; see also id. at 72 (noting the “tendency of
observable cooperation to generate reciprocal cooperation”); Bicchieri, supra note 113, at 846
(“Defection should be expected in all those circumstances in which an individual is anony-
mous . . . .”); Fehr & Ga¨chter, supra note 113, at 164 (“[T]he impact of negative reciprocity
changes radically if subjects are given the opportunity to observe the contributions of others,
and to punish those who do not contribute.”); Ostrom, supra note 113, at 140 (“Face-to-face
communication in a public good game . . . produces substantial increases in cooperation
. . . .”); Sunstein, supra note 111, at 945 (“[A]gents are willing to cooperate, and hence to
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literature a very poor fit for explaining tax compliance.133 A social norm
requires social sanctions, and social sanctions require that others be able to
observe the relevant behavior. If an individual fails every week to put her
recycling bin in front of her house, her neighbors can observe that and im-
pose on her whatever social sanctions a recycling norm might entail. How-
ever, if the same individual every year fails to report a portion of her income
or claims excessive deductions, no one will be in any position to impose any
kind of social sanction on her. That no taxpayer can observe the compliance
or non-compliance of any other taxpayer should imply skepticism about
claims that tax compliance depends on social norms.134
One could argue that what matters in the context of tax compliance is
whether taxpayers perceive that other taxpayers generally do or do not com-
ply with their tax obligations.135 Arguably, a social norm such as reciprocal
cooperation might be sustainable on the basis of what the taxpayer believes
solve collective action problems without coercion, if most people are seen as cooperators
. . . .”).
133 See Trust and Taxpaying, supra note 113, at 408 (“Theoretically, respect should have
little direct effect on compliance because noncompliers can prevent others from knowing they
were cheating, since the IRS is forbidden by law from publicizing an individual’s audit results
even when they find noncompliance.”). Reciprocal cooperation—which is simply not plausi-
ble as among taxpayers—may be plausible as between a taxpayer and the government. See,
e.g., Slemrod, supra note 76, at 40; Smith, supra note 113, at 227 (“The reciprocity and
legitimacy arguments both lead to the proposition that tax authorities’ responsive, respectful,
and fair treatment of taxpayers tends to foster respect for and cooperation with the tax sys-
tem.”). That is, if a taxpayer believes that the government treats her fairly and appropriately,
she may be inclined to reciprocate to the government through tax compliance.
134 This is not to suggest that there is not a social norm against criminal tax fraud or that
there cannot be social sanctions imposed on taxpayers who commit such fraud. Undoubtedly,
if one were convicted of such a crime, one could expect informal social sanctions along with
formal legal sanctions. But prosecutions for criminal tax fraud are rare. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT-
ING OFF., supra note 85, at 4. Actual criminal activity is thus at the outer edge of tax non-
compliance, and it would be a mistake to think that the possibility of social sanctions for a
criminal tax fraud conviction meaningfully informs much taxpayer conduct—particularly in
cases where the substantive law is uncertain. But see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms:
The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1789 (2000) (arguing that criminal tax
conviction “signals” one’s “type” to third parties). For criticisms of Posner’s argument, see
Hardin, supra note 126; Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Pos-
ner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367 (2002). Perhaps the most remarkable
aspect of Kahan’s criticism, which focuses on the non-observability of tax compliance, is that
Kahan seems entirely unaware of the serious problem that non-observability presents for his
own attempt to apply reciprocity theory to tax compliance.
135 See, e.g., Frey & Torgler, supra note 113, at 137 (“[T]he more other taxpayers are
perceived to be honest, the more willing individuals are to pay their own taxes.”); id. at 153
(“An individual taxpayer is influenced strongly by his perception of the behavior of other
taxpayers.”); Logic of Reciprocity, supra note 114, at 74 (“[T]he willingness of individuals to
make costly contributions to collective goods is highly conditional on their perception that
others are willing to do so.”); Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, supra
note 114, at 1520 (“[M]ost taxpayers behave like moral and emotional reciprocators: in decid-
ing whether to pay their taxes in full, they are more influenced by their perception that others
are or are not complying than they are by the material costs and benefits of evasion.”);
Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms about Tax Compliance: From Theory to
Intervention, 26 J. ECON. PSYCH. 862 (2005) (studying effects of taxpayer perceptions of social
tax-compliance norms on taxpayer behavior).
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about the conduct of other taxpayers. If information provided by the govern-
ment about overall compliance levels and anecdotal accounts from relatives,
friends, and acquaintances lead a taxpayer to believe that most taxpayers
comply most of the time, reciprocal cooperation might hold even in the ab-
sence of “face-to-face assurance.”136 That move, however, does nothing to
change the fact that, no matter what the taxpayer believes about other tax-
payers, no one can impose a social sanction against her for not complying
with her tax obligations. At best, it suggests that there may be social norms
regarding “cheap talk” among taxpayers: perhaps it is important in certain
social circles to insist that one always pays all one’s taxes or, in other circles,
to insist that one often takes aggressive tax positions. But a social norm
governing what taxpayers say about their tax compliance is very different
from a social norm that governs whether taxpayers actually comply.137
The norms model also argues that taxpayer compliance involves per-
sonal norms, and here it stands on firmer ground. On this argument, the basis
for compliance is internal rather than external: what matters are the individ-
ual taxpayer’s personal convictions about duty, honesty, and citizenship. Her
own compliance does not depend on whether she can observe others com-
plying or whether others can observe her complying; rather, her motivations
are “intrinsic,” such as a general desire on her part to honor her legitimate
legal obligations.138 But, at this point, the explanation for taxpayer compli-
ance essentially becomes a black box.139 To argue that “something inside”
136 See, e.g., Spicer & Lundstedt, supra note 113, at 297 (“[O]ne may reasonably argue
that if a taxpayer knows many people in groups important to him who evade taxes, then his
commitment to the social norm of tax compliance will be weaker.”).
137 Consider this formulation from the research literature: “An analysis that compared the
impact of various information sources on taxpayers . . . found that social influence (specifi-
cally, perceived attitudes toward noncompliance of the individuals with whom the taxpayer
discussed taxes) had by far the strongest impact on the taxpayer’s commitment and compli-
ance.” Marco R. Steenbergen, Kathleen M. McGraw & John T. Scholz, Taxpayer Adaptation
to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think about Taxes?,
in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 62, at 9, 13 (emphasis added). A taxpayer’s self-
reported “commitment” to comply, based on the attitudes that she has “perceived” among
other taxpayers with whom she has “discussed” taxes, is not even remotely informative. If
there is a social norm at work there, it is simply a norm of cheap talk. A taxpayer can say just
about anything to other taxpayers about what she has done or intends to do with respect to her
taxes; none of it is observable or verifiable.
138 The question of what constitutes a “legitimate” legal obligation is, of course, vague.
See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 102, at 161 (describing legitimacy as “the belief that one ought to
obey the law”); Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS.
L. REV. 379 (1983); Kidder & McEwen, supra note 109, at 52–53 (asserting that, despite
criticisms, “legitimacy is viewed by most social scientists as one of the fundamental glues that
holds societies together”); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, In Search of Legitimacy:
Toward an Empirical Analysis, 8 LAW & POL’Y 257 (1986). But see 1 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE:
AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH, supra note 95, at 8 (“Not surprisingly, survey research has con-
sistently found that taxpayers who report high moral commitment to obey tax laws are unlikely
to report cheating on their taxes. However, it is not clear whether this pattern reflects actual
behavior or merely a desire to report behavior that is consistent with one’s proclaimed
attitudes.”).
139 With no apparent irony or self-consciousness, two researchers on “tax morale” flatly
note that “no objective or observable measure of tax compliance is available.” Frey & Torgler,
138 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 46
the taxpayer causes her to comply with her tax obligations is simply to return
to the original question—the question that neither deterrence nor social
norms could satisfactorily answer. It may well be that the taxpayer’s sense of
duty or respect for the law is an important determinant of her compliance. In
that case, however, it is unclear whether tax compliance presents any con-
cerns distinct from legal compliance generally. More importantly, it suggests
genuine limitations on government’s ability to base tax penalty reform on the
instrumental function of tax penalties: without knowing what is inside the
black box of intrinsic motivations, it is difficult for government to reform tax
penalties specifically for the purpose of promoting tax compliance.
B. The Definitional Function of Tax Penalties
The instrumental function of tax penalties is well recognized in the tax-
compliance literature. The questions of why taxpayers comply and how pen-
alties should be structured to promote compliance remain unsettled and con-
troversial, but the general point that tax penalties encourage tax compliance
is accepted. By contrast, the literature has overlooked a more basic function
of tax penalties—the function of defining tax compliance. The federal in-
come tax is highly indeterminate, and economic transactions of even modest
sophistication regularly encounter uncertainty about the correct interpreta-
tion and application of the substantive tax law. In cases of legal uncer-
tainty—and they are the rule, not the exception—tax penalties establish the
standards of conduct that determine whether taxpayers have complied with
their tax obligations. The current system of penalties, however, establishes
standards that fundamentally conflict with the policy commitment to a self-
assessment tax system. In short, existing tax penalties fail to define tax com-
pliance appropriately.140
supra note 113, at 141. The recent trend of attributing taxpayer compliance to “tax morale”
and then defining “tax morale” as the taxpayer’s “willingness to pay . . . taxes,” see Frey &
Feld, supra note 115, at 6, is emblematic of the problem: the explanation of why taxpayers
comply with their tax obligations has zeroed in on indeterminate “intrinsic” factors that make
taxpayers willing to pay their taxes.
140 The definitional function of tax penalties can be associated with the descriptive side of
legal expressivism. Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes argue that, “[a]t the most general
level, expressive theories tell actors—whether individuals, associations, or the State—to act in
ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various substantive values.” Elizabeth S. An-
derson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000). As applied to law, expressive theories specifically evaluate the
conduct of government and government officials as set forth in law and in actions taken under
the authority of law. Id. at 1511–12. But this overtly normative side of legal expressivism
tends to eclipse its interesting and important descriptive side: before legal expressivism can
evaluate the attitudes expressed by government action, it must first establish what it is that
governmental action expresses. Joel Feinberg’s famous account of the expressive function of
punishment illustrates the distinction. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and
Punishment: Exploring the Relationship Between The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and
The Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 157 (2001). So does
Lessig’s distinction between “contestable” and “not contestable” social meanings. See Law-
rence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 682–85 (1998). The descrip-
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1. How Tax Penalties Define Tax Compliance
Tax penalties define tax compliance; more precisely, the legal condi-
tions that preclude the imposition of tax penalties on a taxpayer define the
standards of conduct that constitute compliance with the taxpayer’s obliga-
tions.141 The argument for that conclusion is very straightforward. The tax
law establishes that a taxpayer who has not complied with her obligations
has satisfied the legal conditions for imposition of a tax penalty.142 It neces-
sarily follows that a taxpayer who has not satisfied the legal conditions for
imposition of a tax penalty has complied with her tax obligations.143 Tax
penalties mark off the boundaries of tax compliance.144
The difficulty here is that, as shown in Part II, the existing accuracy
penalty generally imposes very low standards of conduct on taxpayers when
the law is uncertain. For non-abusive transactions, the accuracy penalty re-
quires that the taxpayer have only a forty-percent chance of winning on the
merits if she does not disclose her position and only a twenty-percent chance
of winning on the merits if she does disclose her position.145 This means that,
as long as the taxpayer meets the forty-percent or twenty-percent threshold
(whichever applies), the taxpayer is not subject to the accuracy penalty even
if she sincerely believes that her position likely will lose in court. In such a
case, the accuracy penalty defines tax compliance as a self-assessment of tax
liabilities based on a legal position that is likely wrong but not too likely
tive side of legal expressivism is essentially interpretive and, as such, is open to the familiar
difficulties and challenges that attend any interpretive exercise. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes,
supra, at 1513, 1524–25. For other general discussions about legal expressivism, see Matthew
D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000);
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
141 This would not include, for example, the discretion of government officials not to im-
pose a penalty in a case that satisfied the legal conditions for imposition of the penalty. Thus, if
the taxpayer’s conduct legally would justify imposition of a penalty but a government official
decides not to impose the penalty, the taxpayer has not complied with her tax obligations.
142 See the discussion of the accuracy penalty in Part II.A, supra.
143 The second statement is simply the contrapositive of the first statement, and the two
statements have the same truth value. To put it slightly more formally: Let C stand for the
proposition “the taxpayer has not complied with her tax obligations,” and let P stand for the
proposition “the taxpayer has satisfied the conditions for imposition of a tax penalty.” Positive
law establishes the truth of the following statement (S): ~ C -> P. The contrapositive of (S)
must also be true; that is, it necessarily follows that: ~ P -> C.
144 At times, the government has expressed this view. See, e.g., COMMISSIONER’S TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at III-1 (asserting that tax penalties accomplish the “setting and
validation of standards of behavior”); id. at VIII-8 (asserting that penalties “define, as a civil
matter, what constitutes an adequately ‘correct’ return”); TREASURY STUDY, supra note 8, at 36
n.99 (quoting INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK § 20.1.1.2 (2008) as stat-
ing that “penalties encourage voluntary compliance by [inter alia] ‘defining standards of
compliant behavior’”); JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 31 (“Penalties for the
failure to comply with laws serve to establish and validate the standards of behavior set forth
by the tax laws themselves . . . . ”). One might identify this aspect of tax penalties with what
Matthew Adler would call the “prescriptive meaning” of law. See Adler, supra note 140, at
1396–97.
145 See supra Part II.A.1–2.
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wrong—or what could be called a “good enough but wrong” legal position.
The standard is only a little better in the case of tax shelters and disclosed
reportable transactions. In those cases, the taxpayer must have both a forty-
percent chance of winning on the merits and a reasonable belief that she has
a greater than fifty-percent chance of winning on the merits.146 Here, then,
compliance requires a self-assessment based on a legal position that the tax-
payer reasonably believes will win, if only barely. In the case of a non-
disclosed reportable transaction, the standard is actually much higher: there,
tax compliance consists of nothing less than a correct self-assessment.147
Thus, the accuracy penalty defines tax compliance as taxpayer conduct that
ranges from taking absolutely correct positions to taking positions that have
an eighty-percent chance of being wrong.
As a policy matter, the government rejects the idea that tax compliance
could include the low standards of conduct permitted under the accuracy
penalty. In its formal report on the tax gap, the IRS insists that a taxpayer is
compliant only if she meets her obligations to assess her tax liability cor-
rectly, to report that liability on her return, and to pay the liability on time
and without compulsion.148 Non-compliance, the government argues, occurs
when the taxpayer does not pay her “true tax liability,”149 which the govern-
ment defines as follows: “[t]rue tax liability for any given taxpayer means
the amount of tax that would be determined for the tax year in question if all
relevant aspects of the tax law were correctly applied to all of the relevant
facts of that taxpayer’s situation.”150 In the view of the IRS, then, “tax com-
pliance” requires that the taxpayer make a correct assessment of her tax
liability with all legal uncertainties resolved correctly.
The government’s understanding of tax compliance probably would
draw broad but not universal support among legislators, other policymakers,
practitioners, and academics; and it does accord with general intuitions about
what it means to comply with the law.151 Much of the practicing bar agrees
with the government’s definition: a commission of the American Bar Associ-
ation asserts that tax compliance “is the timely filing and reporting of re-
quired tax information, the correct self-assessment of income taxes owed,
and the timely payment of those taxes without enforcement action.”152 But,
146 See id.
147 See id. Again, however, the strict-liability standard effectively attaches to the failure to
disclose, since a lower standard applies in the case of a disclosed reportable transaction.
148 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 3, at 6.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 But see 1 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH, supra note 95, at
21–22 (defining “compliance” generally as requiring that the taxpayer file a return that “accu-
rately report[s] tax liability in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and
court decisions applicable at the time the return is filed” but excluding any case in which
“fully informed neutral experts may disagree about how the law should be applied”—that is,
excluding any case involving legal uncertainty).
152 Commission on Taxpayer Compliance, supra note 100, at 338 (emphasis added).
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with or without the concurrence of the bar, the government’s understanding
misstates current law. The tax law provides no basis for distinguishing be-
tween the conduct of different taxpayers other than through the imposition or
non-imposition of a tax penalty. Two identically situated taxpayers—one
who reports and pays her “true tax liability” with her return and one who
pays her “true tax liability” only after the government audits her return and
asserts a deficiency—stand on equal footing unless they are made to pay
different amounts by reason of a tax penalty.
Consider the point with a concrete example. Taxpayer, M, engages in a
non-abusive transaction during Year X that involves a point of uncertainty in
the tax law. The transaction produces a tax liability of either $50,000 or $0.
She cannot say for certain which answer is correct. Her tax advisors tell her
that the point is genuinely in doubt; they advise her that, if she reports $0 of
tax liability from the transaction, there is a sixty-percent chance that she will
lose in litigation. A second taxpayer, N, engages in the same transaction in
Year X and mulls over the same advice about the legal uncertainty. Right up
to the point when they complete their tax returns, M and N are identically
situated. M decides to report and pay the $50,000 tax liability with her re-
turn; she then files a refund claim in which she asserts $0 in tax liability
from the transaction. The government denies the refund claim. M pursues the
matter through litigation and loses on the merits in court. N, by contrast,
decides not to report or pay the $50,000 tax liability with his return. When
the government audits his return and asserts a $50,000 tax deficiency, he
seeks judicial review of the government’s position. N loses on the merits in
court. N then pays the $50,000 deficiency and the applicable interest
charge.153 The government determines that, because there was a forty-percent
chance that N would prevail on the merits when he filed his return, his case
does not satisfy the legal conditions for imposing the accuracy penalty.
The law provides no basis for distinguishing between the compliance
status of M and the compliance status of N; and the law treats them precisely
the same. M is no better off than N for having paid her taxes with her return,
and N is no better off than M for having paid his taxes only after the govern-
ment asserted a deficiency. M paid $50,000 with her Year X tax return; after
losing her refund litigation, her account with the government is even. N paid
$50,000 sometime after filing his Year X tax return plus interest to make the
government whole for the late payment; after losing his deficiency litigation,
his account with the government is even as well. N and M stand in exactly
the same position both before and after filing their tax returns. It cannot be
that M has complied with the law but N has not if they both ultimately pay
the same amount to the government despite taking diametrically opposite
153 Assume that the interest rate charged to N for paying his $50,000 tax liability after
filing his return reflects a market interest rate.
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positions on their tax returns. If M has complied with her tax obligations, so
has N.154
Thus, the government’s insistence that tax compliance requires a correct
self-assessment of the taxpayer’s liability with the correct resolution of legal
uncertainty does not describe the law as it stands today. The differentiation
between non-compliance and compliance is provided through the imposition
of penalties, and, except in the case of abusive transactions, penalties cannot
be imposed as long as the taxpayer has a good-enough-but-wrong legal posi-
tion. An incorrect self-assessment of taxes when the law is uncertain simply
is not sufficient grounds, in those cases, for determining that the taxpayer is
non-compliant.
2. How Tax Penalties Should Define Tax Compliance
“The United States,” Justice Jackson observed, “has a system of taxa-
tion by confession.”155 Since the early days of the federal income tax, Con-
gress has required taxpayers to assess and report their own tax liabilities. In
so doing, it specifically rejected the model used by other nations under
which the government, rather than the taxpayer, assesses liabilities.156 That
basic policy decision places self-assessment at the center of tax compliance;
and that, in turn implies standards of conduct markedly different from the
standards imposed by the current system of tax penalties. As the Staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation noted, the standards required under the existing
accuracy penalty “are so low [that] they provide little incentive for taxpay-
ers to determine the appropriate tax treatment” on their returns.157
The policy commitment to taxpayer self-assessment is striking. The fed-
eral government collects more than $1 trillion each year through the federal
income tax, and those collections are premised on the notion that, for the
most part, taxpayers will determine how much they owe and will remit those
amounts to the government. Although the government backs up the duty of
self-assessment with penalties, criminal sanctions, and forcible collection
procedures, the government starts from the assumption that taxpayers will
turn over roughly ten percent of gross domestic product without actual com-
154 This is not to argue that the definitional function of tax penalties is the only potential
vehicle for the law to define tax compliance. It would be possible for the law to distinguish
between tax compliance and tax non-compliance through other mechanisms. For example, the
government could include M on a public list of taxpayers who did not pay their “true tax
liabilities” until after audit and thereby identify M as non-compliant. But, under current law,
tax penalties provide the distinction between compliant and non-compliant taxpayers.
155 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 36 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). More
prosaically: “A fundamental assumption of the self-assessment system of taxation in the
United States . . . is that taxpayers will come forward with a periodic accounting of their tax
situation, in prescribed formats, and by statutory due dates.” COMMISSIONER’S TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 8, at VI-1.
156 COMMISSIONER’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at VI-29 to VI-30.
157 JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 148.
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pulsion.158 Other systems of taxation do not provide for nearly that level of
taxpayer participation in assessing the amounts owed. Local property taxes
levied throughout the United States, for example, do not require or even
permit taxpayers to assess their own liabilities; instead, local governments
make the assessments and simply demand payment from taxpayers.159 Simi-
larly, employment taxes, such as those financing entitlement programs, gen-
erally do not allow taxpayer self-assessments. But the single largest source
of federal government revenue, the income tax,160 looks to taxpayers to as-
sess and report their liabilities. Along with state income taxes (many of
which are modeled on the federal income tax), the federal income tax is an
outlier in the scope of responsibilities it entrusts to taxpayers.
For present purposes, the policy commitment to self-assessment is
taken as a given. Presumably, that commitment rests on a judgment that, for
an income tax, a self-assessment system is much less costly to administer
than a system of government assessments.161 The income tax has a very
broad scope, and it reaches virtually every economic transaction in which
taxpayers participate. This implies sharp informational asymmetries between
taxpayers and the government: taxpayers have much more information about
their economic transactions than the government does. To allocate the costs
of assessment in the first instance to taxpayers should be more efficient,
even if self-assessment entails selective review and re-assessment by the
government. That efficiency justification implies that tax compliance re-
quires honest and accurate self-assessments by taxpayers. The lower admin-
istrative costs realizable through a system of self-assessment would be lost if
taxpayers were permitted to make dishonest or inaccurate assessments of
their tax liabilities.
Consider, for example, the likely results if government had to treat each
taxpayer’s self-assessment as presumptively incorrect and audited every re-
turn to determine correct tax liabilities. A system in which taxpayers spend
resources to assess their taxes incorrectly and the government then spends
resources to re-assess the taxes actually owed would forfeit all the cost sav-
ings of a self-assessment system. It likely would be even more costly than a
system in which taxpayers made no self-assessments at all.
The policy commitment to self-assessment might also be justified by
reference to principles of political self-determination. One could argue that
legal obligations imposed on citizens in a representative democratic state
effectively constitute legal obligations that citizens impose on themselves
158 Sonya Hoo & Eric Toder, The U.S. Tax Burden Is Low Relative to Other OECD Coun-
tries, 111 TAX NOTES 695 (2006).
159 Of course, taxpayers have a right to challenge the assessments.
160 Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Dir. of the Cong. Budget Office, to Senator Kent Conrad,
at Table 1 (May 18, 2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/81xx/doc8116/05-18-Tax
Revenues.pdf.
161 COMMISSIONER’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at II-1 (arguing that a self-assess-
ment system is likely to be more “efficient” and “accurate” than a system of government
assessment).
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and that government should, to some extent, trust citizens to meet those obli-
gations. This justification for taxpayer self-assessment actually seems
weaker than the efficiency justification for the simple reason that tax sys-
tems in the United States become less trusting of citizens the closer one gets
to actual democracy. At one pole, the federal government—in which any
one citizen has very little say—allows self-assessment for the federal in-
come tax. At the other pole, local governments—in which individual citi-
zens have relatively more say—do not dare to trust taxpayers with self-
assessment of their property taxes. Even so, this political justification also
implies that tax compliance requires honest and accurate self-assessments. If
the underlying notion is that government should trust taxpayers to meet the
tax obligations they have imposed on themselves through legitimate
processes of representative government, that trust could not be meaningful
unless taxpayers were expected to meet those obligations honestly and
accurately.
Thus, the policy commitment to a self-assessment tax system demands
that tax compliance be defined to require honest and accurate self-assess-
ments by taxpayers. Because tax penalties define compliance through the
standards of conduct they set for taxpayers, tax penalties should impose
these requirements of honesty and accuracy. But, as shown above, the cur-
rent system of tax penalties for the most part only requires that taxpayers be
able to justify their reported self-assessments with good-enough-but-wrong
legal positions.
C. The Relationship between the Instrumental and Definitional Functions
In sum, tax penalties serve two distinct but intertwined functions: they
promote tax compliance, but they also define tax compliance. By focusing
exclusively on the instrumental function, the tax-compliance literature gen-
erally has assumed that the starting point for tax penalty reform is to resolve
the question of why taxpayers comply. The underlying intuition is that, be-
cause tax penalties promote tax compliance, policymakers cannot fashion a
sensible and effective penalty regime without first understanding what moti-
vates taxpayers to satisfy their obligations. That, in turn, leads to the compet-
ing claims of the deterrence model and the norms model. Neither model has
given a full and satisfactory account of tax compliance, and each pulls
policymakers in a different direction on penalty reform. Under the deter-
rence model, tax penalties promote compliance by providing the sanctions
that form the basis for deterrence, and the model therefore implies that cur-
rent penalties should be made much stronger across the board. Under the
norms models, tax penalties promote compliance by backstopping, but not
crowding out tax-compliance norms. This model also implies that current
penalties should be strengthened, but it insists that those strengthened penal-
ties should be directed narrowly at taxpayers who do not respond to tax-
compliance norms.
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Tax penalties, however, also serve the more basic function of defining
tax compliance. By distinguishing among the consequences that apply to
different taxpayers, tax penalties determine the standards of taxpayer con-
duct that constitute compliance and non-compliance, including for the great
many cases in which the substantive tax law presents ambiguity, indetermi-
nacy, or other uncertainty. In effect, tax penalties, in their definitional func-
tion, set the compliance target toward which tax penalties, in their
instrumental function, direct taxpayer conduct. This function is perhaps so
fundamental that policymakers have taken it for granted. But, in doing so,
policymakers have allowed the definitional function of tax penalties to go
seriously awry. The current accuracy penalty marks off a definition of tax
compliance that is simply inconsistent with the underlying and long-standing
policy commitment to a self-assessment tax system.
Thus, responsible tax penalty reform requires proper consideration of
both the instrumental function and the definitional function of tax penalties,
but the definitional function is more fundamental. Even if one could resolve
the competing claims of the deterrence model and the norms model to arrive
at a system of tax penalties that would be highly effective in promoting tax
compliance, those efforts would be pointless if the conception of tax compli-
ance being promoted were itself the wrong conception. The appropriate stan-
dards of conduct must come first; the mechanisms for effectively promoting
the appropriate standards can then follow.
IV. REFORMING TAX PENALTIES
This Part sets out the case for tax penalty reform under the definitional
function. The objective is to get the definitional function right—that is, to
describe in general terms a penalty standard that properly defines tax com-
pliance for a self-assessment tax system. The discussion covers the penalties
and standards of conduct for taxpayers, tax practitioners, and government
officials. Points where the reform implications of the definitional function
and the instrumental function converge are noted. However, at points where
those implications diverge, the discussion here gives initial priority to the
definitional function. The outcome is a penalty standard that both captures
the policy commitment to taxpayer self-assessment and provides the starting
point for further penalty reform.
The discussion here does not yield a fully specified system of tax penal-
ties. Any such system would have to take into account both the definitional
and the instrumental functions of tax penalties, and the inquiry here centers
on the definitional function. Thus, the general penalty standard described
here would require further refinement upon consideration of all relevant in-
strumental aspects. It may be, for example, that the accuracy penalty de-
scribed here should be set at a very high level (perhaps more than fifty
percent) for sophisticated corporate taxpayers but at a much lower level (per-
haps no more than the existing twenty percent) for individual taxpayers. It
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may be that the disclosure requirement described here would need refine-
ment to ensure that taxpayers do not have incentives for too much or too
little disclosure. These and other instrumental implications merit close and
sustained consideration as a project for future research. Again, the immedi-
ate objective is to describe a penalty standard that properly fulfills the im-
portant but overlooked definitional function and to demonstrate how much
that standard differs both from current law and from prominent reform
proposals.162
A. Standards of Conduct for Taxpayers
The current accuracy penalty establishes inappropriate standards of tax-
payer conduct. A reformed penalty should set a standard that coheres with
the policy commitment to a self-assessment tax system. That generally im-
plies that taxpayers should be held to higher standards.
1. Inadequacy of the Existing Standards
As outlined in Part II, the accuracy penalty imposes four separate stan-
dards of conduct on taxpayers when they take positions under conditions of
legal uncertainty: the reasonable-basis standard, which requires a twenty-
percent chance of winning on the merits; the substantial-authority standard,
which requires a forty-percent chance of winning; the reasonable-cause-and-
good-faith standard, which requires both a forty-percent chance of winning
and a reasonable belief that there is a greater than fifty-percent chance of
winning; and the strict-liability standard.163 The first three are fault-based;
the fourth is not. None captures the appropriate standard of conduct for a
self-assessment tax system.
Consider first the reasonable-basis and substantial-authority standards
for non-abusive transactions. These standards do not require the taxpayer to
assess and report her tax liabilities based on a correct application of the law;
they do not even require her to assess and report based on a likely correct
application of the law. Instead, the taxpayer avoids the accuracy penalty en-
tirely—which is to say, she complies with her tax obligations—if she as-
sesses and reports her tax liabilities on the basis of a good-enough-but-
wrong legal position. Indeed, she faces no accuracy penalty even if she sin-
cerely believes that her position is likely to be the wrong position. A good-
enough-but-wrong position shields her from the accuracy penalty and en-
162 Additionally, the discussion in this Part effectively treats both government policy and
the conduct of government officials in implementing that policy as exogenous. A more fully
specified system of tax penalties should treat those factors as endogenous. See, e.g., Graetz et
al., supra note 74, at 4–5.
163 See supra Part II.A.1.
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sures her the same outcome that she would have from taking the correct
legal position.164
Congress had reasons for enacting these misguided standards, however
difficult those reasons may be to defend.165 The reasonable-basis standard
loosely tracks the standard for court filings by litigants. The underlying no-
tion appears to be that, as long as the taxpayer discloses the relevant facts of
her transaction to the government, she may assert a mere litigating position
on her tax return.166 But the analogy is misplaced. A pleading or a brief filed
by a litigant in a contested proceeding is all but certain to be reviewed
closely by the litigant’s adversary and, assuming the matter reaches adjudica-
tion on the merits, by an impartial decision-maker. By contrast, a tax return
filed in a self-assessment tax system is treated by the government as pre-
sumptively accurate and is highly unlikely to be reviewed by anyone.167 The
policy decision to maintain a self-assessment system trades routine govern-
164 The jurat required on the taxpayer’s return does not change this conclusion. The tax-
payer’s signature on her tax return verifies, under penalties of perjury, that “to the best of
[her] knowledge and belief, [the return is] true, correct, and complete.” See IRS Form 1040
(2007). The jurat is backed by a criminal sanction which applies if the taxpayer who signs the
jurat “does not believe [the return] to be true and correct as to every material matter.” See
I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2006). This merely prevents the taxpayer from taking a position that she
knows to be wrong. It does not prevent her from taking a position that she thinks is likely
wrong—even very likely wrong—but that is not so wrong that it flunks the reasonable-basis or
substantial-authority standard. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (good faith
misunderstanding of tax law not a violation of known legal duty); United States v. Pomponio,
429 U.S. 10 (1976) (“willfully” element of section 7206(1) requires violation of known legal
duty). The same legal uncertainty that puts her tax position in play for purposes of the reasona-
ble-basis or substantial-authority standard ensures that she does not violate the jurat.
165 One point on which the enactment of these standards can be defended is that, under
prior law, the only potentially applicable penalties for inaccurate taxpayer self-assessments
were the negligence and fraud penalties. As Michael Asimow argued at the time, this created a
large unregulated area. Michael Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax
Returns, 23 UCLA L. REV. 637, 652 (1976) (“Between careless inaccuracies and quasi-crimi-
nality lies an immense middle ground: an endless array of cases involving reckless or inten-
tional overstatement of deductions or understatement of income which lack the flagrancy
necessary for imposition of the fraud penalty.”). For a contrary view, see Richard C. Stark, A
Principled Approach to Collection and Accuracy-Related Penalties, 91 TAX NOTES 115, 135
(2001) (arguing that prior law “generally accorded well with the objectives of penalties and
their proper place in tax administration”). The fact that the reasonable-basis and substantial-
authority standards helped to fill the large gap between negligence and fraud does not imply,
however, that they filled it adequately.
166 See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 8, at 97 (“A reasonable basis standard essentially
treats taxpayers and the IRS as adversaries and permits taxpayers to take what is essentially a
litigating position on their tax return.”). As originally enacted in 1982, this defense mandated
only disclosure of the taxpayer’s position. The requirement that the disclosed position have a
reasonable basis was added by Congress in section 13251 of the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–66, 107 Stat. 531 (codified at I.R.C. § 6662(2)(B)(ii)(II)
(2006)). For the historical development of the penalties on taxpayer conduct through 1989, see
COMMISSIONER’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at V-1 to V–53. For the historical devel-
opment of these penalties from 1989 through 1999, see TREASURY STUDY, supra note 8, at
25–32.
167 JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 162 (“[T]he position on the tax return is
assumed to be correct under present law and the risk of challenge by the IRS to that assump-
tion is low.”).
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ment scrutiny of tax returns off against low administrative costs, but it justi-
fies that trade-off by requiring accurate self-assessment and reporting. The
reasonable-basis standard directly undermines that justification: it gives the
taxpayer the full benefit of asserting a highly aggressive position on her
return—one that has as much as an eighty-percent chance of losing on the
merits—with only a negligible chance that anyone will push back from the
government side.168 In a self-assessment system, a tax return cannot be
treated as simply an argument made in an adversarial proceeding. It must be
taken for what the self-assessment system assumes it to be—a correct deter-
mination of tax liability.
The legislative rationale for the substantial-authority standard is hardly
more defensible. Congress enacted the standard in 1982, specifically re-
jecting a proposed requirement that the taxpayer’s position be “more likely
than not” to prevail.169 The Conference Committee disingenuously implied
that the only alternative to the substantial-authority standard was strict liabil-
ity170 and that the substantial-authority standard would distinguish taxpayers
who took “highly aggressive” positions from those “who endeavor in good
faith to fairly self-assess.”171 Substantial authority, however, protects even
taxpayers who do not “endeavor in good faith to fairly self-assess” because
it requires that their positions have only a forty-percent chance of winning
on the merits. Put differently, it allows taxpayers to resolve legal uncertainty
168 See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 8, at 106 (arguing that “litigating standards” for the
accuracy penalty are improper “in light of the practical limitations on the IRS’s ability to audit
returns and reliance of the tax system on the self-reporting of taxpayers and policing function
of tax practitioners.”); COMMISSIONER’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at VIII-10 to
VIII–11 (“[A] simple litigating standard does not adequately protect the self-assessment ob-
jective . . . .”); Lee A. Sheppard, What are Penalties For?, 85 TAX NOTES 709, 709 (1999) (“A
tax return is not adversarial. A return is an attested document. It is signed by the taxpayer and
the preparer under penalties of perjury. It is not an opening offer. It is not a submission in an
adversarial proceeding.”). The same criticism has been made of tax practitioners. See, e.g.,
Handelman, supra note 43, at 89–93; Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging the Adversarial Ap-
proach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 705–41 (1997).
169 The Senate Finance Committee had sent to the Senate floor a bill that required the
taxpayer to have “a subjective belief that [her] treatment [of an item] was more likely than
not to be sustained if the issue were challenged and litigated.” S. REP. NO. 97–494, at 273
(1982). The change to the substantial-authority standard was made by floor amendment. See
128 CONG. REC. 17,220–27 (1982) (floor amendment of Senator Armstrong (R-CO)). Senator
Armstrong’s remarks in support of the amendment flatly indicate that he sought the lower
standard at the behest of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, an interest
group representing the accounting industry. See id. at 17,224. Notably, one of Senator Arm-
strong’s co-sponsors on the amendment to weaken the standard of taxpayer conduct was Sena-
tor Baucus (D-MT), see id. at 17,220, who presently leads the legislative crusade against the
tax gap. See, e.g., News Release, Senate Fin. Comm., Hearing Statement of Senator Max
Baucus (D-Mont.) Regarding the Administration’s Plan for Reducing the Tax Gap (Apr. 18,
2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/press/Bpress/2007press/prb041807b.pdf.
170 The Conference Committee reported that it had rejected “an absolute standard that a
taxpayer may take a position on a return only if, in fact, the position reflects the correct treat-
ment of the item because, in some circumstances, tax advisors may be unable to reach so
definitive a conclusion.” H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 575 (1982). This, of course, conflated the
more-likely-than-not standard with the strict-liability standard.
171 Id.
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against the government as long as they have no more than a sixty-percent
chance of losing. As Senator Grassley (R-IA) argued, the substantial-author-
ity standard allows “taxpayers to report taxable transactions in ways they
believe to be incorrect . . . .”172 Taking such positions is very different from
“endeavor[ing] in good faith to fairly self-assess.”173 Thus, Congress was
wrong to settle on the substantial-authority standard in 1982, and the Trea-
sury Department was wrong when it recommended to Congress in 1999 that
the substantial-authority standard continue to apply for purposes of the accu-
racy penalty.174
The reasonable-basis and substantial-authority standards fail as well on
the instrumental function of tax penalties. Consider first how they play out
under the deterrence model. A taxpayer who has a reasonable basis for a
disclosed position or substantial authority for a non-disclosed position gener-
ally will resolve legal uncertainty in her own favor because the expected
return from taking a good-enough-but-wrong position will exceed the ex-
pected return from taking the correct position. To see this concretely, assume
that a taxpayer with a thirty-five-percent marginal tax rate faces legal uncer-
tainty on whether a $1,000,000 receipt from a non-abusive transaction con-
stitutes income. Assume that she has been advised that there is substantial
authority for excluding the $1,000,000 from income, that there is only a
forty-percent chance that the exclusion would be sustained on the merits,
and that the better legal answer therefore is to include the $1,000,000 in
income. She has two options. Including the $1,000,000 in income will cost
her $350,000. Excluding the $1,000,000, even with the expectation that she
will concede the issue if the government raises it on audit, will cost her some
amount less than $350,000; specifically, it will cost her $350,000, dis-
counted by the probability that the government will examine her return and
assert that the $1,000,000 receipt constitutes income.175 If that probability is
assumed to be twenty-five percent, her expected cost of relying on the sub-
stantial-authority position to exclude the receipt will be only $87,500. Ex-
cluding the receipt plainly has greater economic value than including it, even
172 128 CONG. REC. 17,225 (1982).
173 For additional discussion of the development of the substantial-authority standard in
Congress and in the case law, see Merrill Glenn Jones II, Note, Osteen v. Commissioner: In
Search of a Workable Test for Substantial Authority in “All or Nothing” Substantial Under-
statement Penalty Cases, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 1201–07 (1996).
174 See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 8, at 108. More specifically, the Treasury Depart-
ment recommended that, for non-abusive transactions, the standard of taxpayer conduct for
non-disclosed positions should continue to be the substantial-authority standard, and the stan-
dard of conduct for disclosed positions should be a “realistic possibility of success.” Id. The
realistic-possibility-of-success standard requires at least a one-in-three chance of prevailing on
the merits. Id. at 103. By contrast, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation recommended
that the substantial-authority standard replace the reasonable-basis standard for disclosed posi-
tions on non-abusive transactions. See JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 5, 162–64.
175 This assumes a fair rate of interest.
150 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 46
though it is likely the wrong answer and even though she believes it is likely
the wrong answer.176
The literature on the deterrence model argues that the expected penal-
ties under current law are too low; it recommends increasing nominal penal-
ties, increasing the probability of penalty imposition, or both. But, even if
the deterrence model accurately accounts for tax compliance, those recom-
mendations are misplaced as long as tax penalties continue to define tax
compliance improperly. In the example above, the taxpayer’s expected pen-
alties could be increased many times over without changing the result. As
long as tax penalties define compliance down to the low standards of reason-
able basis and substantial authority, even strikingly high expected penalties
will not cause the taxpayer to prefer the correct position over a good-
enough-but-wrong position. It is not the low expected penalty that gives the
taxpayer the wrong incentive; it is the impunity conferred by the reasonable-
basis and substantial-authority standards. Without the proper definition of
tax compliance in place, no level of expected penalty will induce a taxpayer
to meet the standard of conduct assumed by a self-assessment system.177
Consider now the implications of these standards under the norms
model. The norms model posits that taxpayers comply with their tax obliga-
tions to satisfy social or personal norms, but it does not suggest that such
norms lead taxpayers to do more than what the law requires. Under these
standards, all that the law requires is that taxpayers have a good-enough-but-
wrong legal position in support of their likely inaccurate self-assessments. In
fact, the substantial-authority and reasonable-basis standards could be con-
strued as expressions of government indifference toward inaccurate self-as-
sessments that fall within their parameters. The mere existence of the
176 The same result applies even if she decides to litigate the treatment of the $1,000,000
receipt. In that case, including the $1,000,000 receipt in income has an expected cost of
$210,000 (ignoring litigation expenses): she would include the amount on her return, pay the
$350,000 tax, and file a refund suit that would have an expected return of $140,000 (forty
percent of $350,000). Excluding the $1,000,000 receipt has an expected cost (again, ignoring
litigation expenses) of $210,000 discounted by the probability that the government will ex-
amine her return, assert that the $1,000,000 constitutes income, and litigate against her. If that
probability is twenty-five percent, her expected cost of excluding the receipt is only $52,500.
Both these examples assume, of course, that the taxpayer correctly judges the ex ante likeli-
hood of prevailing on the merits. Setting optimal sanctions under the deterrence model be-
comes significantly more difficult if that assumption does not hold. See generally Louis
Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about
Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1990).
177 Additionally, the fact that an incorrect legal position backed by substantial authority or
a reasonable basis can have greater economic value than the correct legal position encourages
the taxpayer to invest resources in identifying such an incorrect position. If the expected tax
savings from the inaccurate assessment are sufficient, she can pay for tax advice that provides
her with a legal justification for inaccurate assessment and reporting. Viewed from the per-
spective of the deterrence model, then, the current accuracy penalty produces results that are
the opposite of what they should be. Rather than encouraging taxpayers to invest in assessing
and reporting their tax liabilities correctly, the substantial-authority and reasonable-basis stan-
dards encourage taxpayers to invest in determining the best legal argument for assessing and
reporting their tax liabilities incorrectly.
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reasonable-basis and substantial-authority standards implies that no taxpayer
should be expected to follow the correct answer or even the likely correct
answer when the taxpayer identifies legal uncertainty. If the taxpayer has a
twenty-percent chance of winning on the merits and is honest enough to
disclose the relevant facts of the underlying transaction to the government,
she has the satisfaction of knowing that she has done everything asked of
her. If she has a forty-percent chance of winning, she need not even disclose
anything about the transaction to have that satisfaction. By setting the stan-
dards of conduct so low, government signals that it does not expect even
honest, diligent, compliance-minded taxpayers to assess their tax liabilities
on the basis of anything stronger than a good-enough-but-wrong legal posi-
tion. There is no reason to think that social or personal norms would set the
bar of tax compliance any higher than the government has set it.
The accuracy penalty imposes higher standards of conduct on taxpayers
engaging in potentially abusive transactions. For tax shelters and disclosed
reportable transactions, the standard is reasonable-cause-and-good-faith; this
requires the taxpayer to have both a forty-percent chance of winning and a
reasonable belief that she has a greater than fifty-percent chance of win-
ning.178 The standard requires that the taxpayer believe that her self-assess-
ment is likely correct, and in that respect, it improves on the standards that
apply for non-abusive transactions. However, the reasonable-cause-and-
good-faith standard still permits the taxpayer to resolve significant levels of
legal uncertainty in her own favor. When she reasonably believes that the
legal considerations are almost in equipoise—fifty-one percent in her favor
and forty-nine percent in the government’s favor—the reasonable-cause-and-
good-faith standard treats her as complying with her tax obligations.
The policy commitment to a self-assessment tax system—with its de
facto presumption that the taxpayer’s return is correct—generally requires a
higher level of legal certainty when the taxpayer decides to resolve an issue
in her own favor.179 Self-assessment is justified in large part by the signifi-
cant informational asymmetries between the taxpayer and the government.
One of those asymmetries is that it is the taxpayer, not the government, who
knows which aspects of her tax return rest on certain positions and which
rest on uncertain positions. A standard that allows the taxpayer to allocate to
the government the risk of her incorrect assessment in a close case—which
178 See supra Part II.A.2.
179 For analyses concluding that the more-likely-than-not standard is adequate, see, e.g.,
JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 5, 161–62 (recommending more-likely-than-not
standard for undisclosed positions); Beale, supra note 43, at 593 (arguing that taxpayers and
advisors should be subject to a more-likely-than-not standard). A 1989 penalty study by a
government task force arrived at odd recommendations on this point. On the one hand, it
insisted that taxpayers should report on the basis of positions that were “probably correct.”
See COMMISSIONER’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at VIII-13. On the other hand, it
defined “probably correct” down to a forty-five percent chance of winning on the merits and
effectively equated it with the substantial-authority standard. See id. at VIII-39. These jumbled
recommendations may have reflected inconsistent views among members of the task force.
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is the effect of the reasonable-cause-and-good-faith standard—excuses her
from any obligation to narrow the legal uncertainty.
Narrowing that uncertainty, if possible, is important. Although “rela-
tively small” legal uncertainty may lead to undesirable “overcompliance”
with taxpayer obligations, “[v]ery broad uncertainty . . . is more likely to
lead to undercompliance.”180 It is the taxpayer, not the government, who
stands in a better position to eliminate or reduce the range of legal uncer-
tainty in applying the tax law to her circumstances. At a minimum, the tax-
payer who takes a position believing that it just satisfies a more-likely-than-
not standard should be required to disclose the fact and extent of the under-
lying legal uncertainty. That way, the government is alerted that the position
identified in the taxpayer’s disclosure is uncertain, and it can pursue resolu-
tion of the uncertainty if it believes the issue is important.
It is important to this point that the law provides the taxpayer with
mechanisms for addressing legal uncertainty both before and after filing her
return. The taxpayer can obtain advice from a tax practitioner. She also can
seek government review of a legal question before filing her return—in fact,
before even engaging in a transaction—by requesting a “letter ruling” from
the IRS.181 If granted, the ruling binds the government on the tax issue that it
addresses.182 After filing her return, the taxpayer can pursue an administra-
tive refund claim with the government.183 If she is dissatisfied with the dis-
position of her claim, she can undertake refund litigation in federal court.184
These mechanisms belie the customary objection among tax practitioners
that “many situations arise where it is simply not possible . . . to conclude
that any position is more likely than not correct.”185 In such cases, the appro-
priate action for the taxpayer is to resolve the doubt in favor of the govern-
ment—which protects her from the accuracy penalty—and then, if she
wants, to pursue resolution of the legal uncertainty after filing her return.
Just as it is less costly for the taxpayer, rather than the government, to assess
the taxpayer’s liabilities in the first place, so too is it less costly for the
taxpayer, rather than the government, to identify the positions on her return
180 Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986); see also John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).
181 See 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(2) (2008); see also Beale, supra note 43, at 641–42. Some
taxpayers purchase third-party insurance for the desired tax effects of their transactions. See
generally Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX
REV. 339 (2005).
182 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(l) (2008).
183 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402–03.
184 I.R.C. § 7422 (2006); see also Beale, supra note 43, at 638–39 n.209 (arguing that
requiring “taxpayers to test aggressive theories in suits for refunds seems appropriate”).
185 Letter from the A.B.A. Section of Taxation to Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Fin., and Senator Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Fin. 2 (Nov.
15, 2007) (on file with author), available at http://ippubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/DER.NSF/c7ab0d
5fa310608385256605005341f4/852564530074ae98852573960017c4ab?OpenDocument
[hereinafter Letter from the American Bar Ass’n Section of Taxation] (emphasis added).
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that involve substantial legal uncertainty and, when reasonable to do so, to
address the uncertainty.186
That does not imply, however, that the taxpayer should be strictly liable
for the accuracy penalty. Academics have argued for a strict-liability accu-
racy penalty on the general ground that it would improve deterrence.187 But
strict liability goes too far. The strict-liability standard defines tax compli-
ance as an absolute requirement to assess and report the correct tax liability.
It flatly rules any good faith mistake or misinterpretation by the taxpayer out
of bounds for tax compliance, and it implies that tax compliance requires the
taxpayer either to arrive at the correct outcome on every issue or to resolve
all doubts in favor of the government. Even the taxpayer’s best efforts to
comply will be penalized if it turns out that she has taken the wrong
position.188
Those outcomes are not consistent with the policy commitment to a
self-assessment system. A self-assessment system looks in the first instance
to taxpayers to determine their own tax liabilities and to report those liabili-
ties to the government. But taxpayers who must make those determinations
under a strict-liability standard will understand that even their best efforts to
reach the right results are inadequate. Strict liability undermines the assump-
tion that government can trust taxpayers to assess their own taxes with integ-
rity and that taxpayers can trust government to review those self-assessments
with integrity.189
A strict-liability standard also undermines the efficiency justification
for self-assessment. Although a fault-based standard can be more costly to
apply than strict liability insofar as it requires individualized determinations
about whether the fault-based standard has been met, strict liability can be
more costly overall because the enforcement and collection of penalties it-
self is costly, and the strict-liability standard implies enforcement and collec-
tion for every act of non-compliance.190 Additionally, strict liability for the
accuracy penalty may drive more tax issues into litigation on the underlying
186 Of course, lower-income taxpayers (to the extent they have positive tax liability) gen-
erally should not be required to expend resources to resolve questions of legal uncertainty.
Under a better system of tax administration, the government would provide pre-filing assis-
tance to lower-income taxpayers or such taxpayers would be relieved entirely from the obliga-
tion to file returns. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A
SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (2007).
187 See, e.g., Logue, supra note 75; Shaviro, supra note 77.
188 See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 77, at 33, 36.
189 Even a government task force has expressed concern that a strict-liability standard
might undermine the self-assessment system. See COMMISSIONER’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 8, at VIII-36 (“The Task Force was concerned that regularly penalizing taxpayers . . .
would be considered unfair, would destroy the moral and ethical connotations of the penalty,
and would ultimately undermine the standard of behavior. Thus, the Task Force rejected a strict
liability penalty.”).
190 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 52, 56, 70. If the government applied a strict-
liability standard on a selective basis (that is, imposing liability on some, but not all, taxpayers
who satisfy the legal conditions for liability), the government would incur costs of making
individualized determinations about when to impose or not to impose liability.
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merits, yielding back some of the efficiency gains of having a self-assess-
ment system in the first place. The standard could even cause self-assess-
ment to unravel altogether if taxpayers—who might accept the high costs
imposed on them by a requirement to do their best in self-assessing their
taxes—reject the much higher costs imposed on them by an absolute re-
quirement that they arrive at the correct tax result, with no margin for
error.191
2. The Standard Required for a Self-Assessment System
The policy commitment to a self-assessment tax system implies a stan-
dard of taxpayer conduct more stringent than the three existing fault-based
standards but not as unforgiving as the strict-liability standard. The decision
to administer the income tax through self-assessment reflects a judgment
that taxpayers have superior information about their economic transactions
and can determine their tax liabilities at lower cost than the government. It
also reflects a judgment that, on the whole, taxpayers can be trusted to assess
and report their tax liabilities with minimal reassessment by the government.
Both those judgments are undermined by any definition of tax compliance
that does not require the taxpayer to make her best efforts to arrive at the
correct determination of her tax liability. Accordingly, the accuracy penalty
should apply to any understatement of the taxpayer’s tax liability attributable
to a position that she does not reasonably and in good faith believe to be
correct.
Under this standard, the tax return filed by the taxpayer must reflect her
reasonable, good faith belief that the tax she has assessed and reported on
that return is correct. As part of this obligation, the taxpayer must try to
resolve legal uncertainties. In some cases, she will be able to determine in
reasonable good faith that she would be correct to resolve the uncertainty in
her favor. When she cannot, she should resolve the uncertainty in the gov-
ernment’s favor. Alternatively, if she believes in reasonable good faith that
the arguments in her favor are more likely than not to prevail, she can re-
solve the uncertainty in her own favor as long as she discloses and describes
the uncertainty on her return.  That disclosure would both describe the un-
derlying transaction and the taxpayer’s legal analysis of why she believes her
claimed tax treatment is more likely than not correct. By discharging those
obligations, the taxpayer will file a tax return with the government that rep-
resents her best effort to make an accurate self-assessment of her tax liability
and to apprise the government of points where the law that bears on her tax
liability remains uncertain.
This standard demands more of the taxpayer than the existing fault-
based standards. A good-enough-but-wrong position is not adequate. Even a
more-likely-than-not position does not protect the taxpayer under this stan-
191 This last point was suggested by George Yin.
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dard for an undisclosed position. A position that the taxpayer believes is
barely likely to win is not necessarily a position that the taxpayer reasonably
and in good faith believes to be correct. At the very least, a nearly even
chance of prevailing or losing suggests that the taxpayer should undertake
further inquiry to determine whether the legal uncertainty can be resolved. If
the taxpayer reasonably and in good faith believes that the legal question is
very close but tilts in her favor, she demonstrates her good faith by disclos-
ing and describing the legal uncertainty on her return. In that way, she does
not pass off a position with a bare likelihood of being right as though it were
a position on which there could be no reasonable disagreement.
This penalty standard does not amount to strict liability. The tax law is
ambiguous and indeterminate, and tax returns are intricate and often difficult
documents. Careful, diligent, and reasonable taxpayers make both factual
and legal mistakes in completing their returns, and the government cannot
fairly hold them to a standard that penalizes them without regard to their
good faith efforts to reach the right answers. By the same token, this stan-
dard, in contrast to the existing fault-based standards, is not reducible to a
purely probabilistic calculation about winning on the merits. The ultimate
inquiry for the government in imposing the accuracy penalty under this stan-
dard and for a court in determining whether to uphold the penalty is not the
ex ante odds that the taxpayer will win or lose on a position that she reports
in her own favor. Rather, the inquiry is whether the taxpayer invests the
resources, effort, and integrity assumed by a self-assessment tax system to
be appropriate for arriving at her correct tax liability. That inquiry necessa-
rily is both subjective and objective: it must take account of (and make al-
lowances for) the taxpayer’s abilities, resources, and sophistication; but it
must also hold the taxpayer to an objective standard of reasonableness. A
taxpayer with no particular financial sophistication who does not have the
resources to consult a tax advisor or seek an advance ruling from the govern-
ment might reasonably and in good faith mistakenly claim an exclusion or
deduction that a sophisticated taxpayer with resources should not. Yet cer-
tain exclusions and deductions would lie beyond the boundaries of reasona-
bleness for any taxpayer.192
Finally, this standard does not distinguish among transactions by their
potential for tax abuse as the existing accuracy penalty does. The labels con-
trived by current law—such as “tax shelter” and “reportable transaction”—
suggest that taxpayers should be held to higher standards of conduct only
when they engage in suspect transactions. Instead, a conception of tax com-
pliance thick enough and robust enough for a self-assessment system re-
quires taxpayers to satisfy a higher standard of conduct in all cases. Whether
the taxpayer’s self-assessment and reporting of her tax liabilities fall short of
the standard should be determined by how the taxpayer applies the law to
192 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE TRUTH ABOUT FRIVOLOUS TAX ARGUMENTS
(2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv_tax.pdf.
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her transaction rather than how the government happens to label it. Of
course, the more aggressively a transaction is structured, the more difficult it
will be for the taxpayer to establish that she reasonably and in good faith
believed a self-assessment in her own favor was correct.193
B. Standards of Conduct for Tax Practitioners
The penalties under current law for tax practitioners also provide inap-
propriate standards of conduct. As outlined in Part II, current law separates
tax practitioners into three categories—advisors, return preparers, and pro-
moters—and imposes separate standards of conduct on each. In none of
these cases does current law hold practitioners to the standard of conduct
appropriate for a tax system organized around the principle of taxpayer self-
assessment.
The variation in the current penalty standards for tax practitioners is
striking. At one extreme, a promoter can be penalized only if she makes
materially “false or fraudulent” statements about the tax benefits of the
transaction or product that she promotes.194 The standard of conduct is sim-
ply not to lie. At the other extreme, a practitioner who is a return preparer
can be penalized if a position on the taxpayer’s return involving a tax shelter
or a reportable transaction is not supported by substantial authority and a
reasonable belief that the position is more likely than not to prevail.195 In
between these extremes, advisors are subject to the standards of Circular
230, which generally require candor, diligence, and good conduct but do not
prohibit the advisor from giving favorable advice on weak legal positions
(except in the case of certain transactions having the potential for tax
abuse).196 These standards are inconsistent with the policy commitment to a
193 The standard is fault-based, and it requires a subjective inquiry about the taxpayer as
well as an objective inquiry about the reasonableness of the taxpayer’s beliefs. Those points
suggest that the standard will be costly to administer. Certainly, the decision whether to im-
pose the accuracy penalty under this standard and the decision whether to uphold imposition of
the penalty will be more costly than they would be for an objective strict-liability standard,
even if the total costs attributable to a strict-liability standard are higher—because, for exam-
ple, it provokes more litigation about the merits of the underlying tax positions. However, it is
not clear at all that the administration of the standard suggested in the text would be more
costly than the administration of the current accuracy penalty, which requires determinations
of the classification of the underlying transaction (for example, whether it is an abusive trans-
action and, if so, whether it is a tax shelter or a reportable transaction), the ex ante probability
of winning (twenty percent, forty percent, or greater than fifty percent), and (in certain cases)
the taxpayer’s subjective belief about the ex ante probability of winning. Still, as noted above,
the details of the penalties under this standard will require refinement under the instrumentalist
function.
194 See supra Part II.B.3.
195 See supra Part II.B.2.
196 See supra Part II.B.1. The Circular 230 rules for opinions on potentially abusive trans-
actions have been soundly and thoughtfully criticized. See Deborah H. Schenk, The Circular
230 Amendments: Time to Throw Them Out and Start Over, 110 TAX NOTES 1311 (2006).
However, some criticisms are more than a bit overdone. See, e.g., Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Jaime
Vasquez, Section 10.35(b)(4)(ii) of Circular 230 Is Invalid (But Just in Case It Is Valid, Please
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self-assessment tax system. In such a system, the penalties for tax practition-
ers should impose a standard of conduct that dovetails with the standard for
taxpayers. Whether they act as advisors, return preparers, or promoters, the
role of tax practitioners is ancillary to that of the taxpayer; if the object of
the taxpayer’s conduct is to assess and report accurately, the object of the
practitioner’s conduct should be to assist in correct assessments and
reporting.197
All the practitioner standards under current law fall short of this target.
The standard for promoters—that they refrain from lying about the tax bene-
fits of a transaction or product—is remarkably low. The no-lying standard
allows a promoter to make statements and representations about the tax con-
sequences of a transaction that, if relied on by the taxpayer in determining
her tax liability, would cause the taxpayer to incur the accuracy penalty. That
obviously increases self-assessment costs for the taxpayer. In most cases, the
promoter understands the transaction better than the taxpayer does, yet the
low standard of conduct allows the promoter to provide the taxpayer with
useless or simply bad information. This moves the taxpayer’s compliance
efforts backward: she must expend additional resources to evaluate any legal
conclusions asserted by the promoter to determine whether she can reasona-
bly and in good faith treat them as correct.
The existing standards for tax advisors are also misguided. With an
overriding duty to make her best efforts at the correct self-assessment of her
tax liability, the taxpayer relies on the tax advisor to help her evaluate the
strength of various possible legal positions and to resolve or narrow legal
uncertainties that bear on those positions. But the current standards for tax
advisors generally do not require that the advisor counsel the taxpayer about
the standard that applies to the taxpayer’s self-assessment and do not require
that the advisor indicate whether positions that the taxpayer might take on
her return meet that standard. The standard of conduct for advising the tax-
payer in writing on a potentially abusive transaction improves on the general
standards but still applies to only one aspect of the advisory relationship. To
support the taxpayer’s own duties in a self-assessment system, the standards
should require that, for any advice provided to the taxpayer, the advisor must
judge the strength of the taxpayer’s possible positions, advise the taxpayer of
those conclusions, and indicate how those conclusions compare to the tax-
payer’s own obligations as defined by the accuracy penalty.
Note that You Cannot Rely on this Article to Avoid the Imposition of Penalties), 7 HOUS. BUS.
& TAX L.J. 293 (2007).
197 By contrast, efforts to use tax practitioners as a bulwark against non-compliance by
driving a wedge between tax practitioners and taxpayers should be considered with great skep-
ticism. Compare David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331 (2006) (demon-
strating deficiencies in such approaches), with Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The
Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77 (2006) (advocating
such approaches), and Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar
into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 73–98 (2001) (same).
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The standards for return preparers present the same problem. These
standards are the same low standards that apply to the taxpayer: for a non-
abusive transaction, the position need only have a twenty-percent chance of
winning (if disclosed) or a forty-percent chance of winning (if not dis-
closed), so a good-enough-but-wrong position is sufficient; for a tax shelter
or a reportable transaction, there need only be a forty-percent chance of win-
ning and a reasonable belief of a greater than fifty-percent chance of win-
ning. For the same reasons that these standards are insufficient in the case of
the taxpayer,198 they are insufficient in the case of the return preparer.
In short, the standards of conduct for tax practitioners should support
compliance by taxpayers. Whether practitioners sell transactions, provide
advice, or prepare returns, they should be held to the same standard that
applies to taxpayers. Promoters, advisors, and return preparers should not be
legally justified in making statements, rendering opinions, or taking return
positions unless the taxpayer herself would be justified in self-assessing and
reporting her tax liabilities on the same basis. Any mismatch in standards
can only weaken taxpayer compliance. Thus, a promoter should be subject to
penalty for making a statement about the tax effects of a transaction or prod-
uct unless the promoter reasonably and in good faith believes the statement
to be correct; an advisor should be subject to penalty for providing a
favorable opinion on a legal position unless the advisor reasonably and in
good faith believes that position to be correct; and a return preparer should
be subject to penalty for any understatement on the taxpayer’s return based
on a disclosed position that does not meet the more-likely-than-not standard
or a non-disclosed position that the return preparer does not reasonably and
in good faith believe to be correct.199
C. Standards of Conduct for Government Officials
A self-assessment tax system also should impose high standards of con-
duct on the officials charged with administering the tax law. For government
legitimately to require that taxpayers make their best efforts to self-assess
and report their tax liabilities accurately, taxpayers must be able to expect
reciprocal treatment from government. This implies that government offi-
cials should be accountable for improperly challenging substantive positions
taken by taxpayers and for improperly asserting penalties against them or
against tax practitioners.
198 See supra Part IV.A.1.
199 Cf. Matthew C. Ames, Formal Opinion 352: Professional Integrity and the Tax Audit
Lottery, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 429–30 (1987) (arguing that the standard of conduct for
tax advisors and return preparers should be one of “substantial[ ] certain[ty]”). Others have
suggested lower practitioner standards. See, e.g., Handelman, supra note 43, at 103 (proposing,
as standard for return preparers, that any non-disclosed position taken on tax return be “sup-
ported” by at least one legal “authority”); Jay A. Soled, Third-Party Civil Tax Penalties and
Professional Standards, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1611, 1650–53 (proposing a more-likely-than-not
standard for tax practitioners).
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The standard set by current law is far too low. Government must pay
taxpayer costs when it takes an unjustified position, but the threshold for
payment requires the government’s position to fall below a twenty-percent
chance of winning on the merits.200 This standard presumably rests on the
assumption that the government’s re-assessment of the taxpayer’s tax liabili-
ties and the government’s assertion of accuracy penalties is nothing more
than a litigating position. Thus, all the government needs is a good-enough-
but-wrong legal position to avoid sanction. Again, the litigation analogy is
misplaced. The government’s re-assessment of the taxpayer’s liabilities mir-
rors in point and purpose the taxpayer’s self-assessment of her own liabili-
ties. The objective in both cases is to determine the taxpayer’s correct tax
liability; that objective must control the conduct of government officials in
any assertion of taxpayer or tax practitioner liability made during audit or in
litigation.201
The re-assessment of the taxpayer’s liabilities made by the government
is certain to be salient to the taxpayer; it effectively occupies the same pos-
ture vis a` vis the taxpayer that a disclosed position on the taxpayer’s return
occupies vis a` vis the government. Therefore, the standard that should apply
to re-assessment by the government is the same more-likely-than-not stan-
dard that should apply to the taxpayer when the taxpayer makes disclosure
on her return.202 In other words, a government official should be subject to
sanctions when she asserts tax or penalty liability against a taxpayer or a tax
practitioner based on a position that the government official does not reason-
ably and in good faith believe to have a greater than fifty-percent chance of
prevailing on the merits.
That said, sanctions on government officials present particular opera-
tional problems. Even if such penalties properly define the standards of con-
duct for government officials, they may fail on the instrumental function. As
Daryl Levinson has argued, government likely does not internalize costs in
the same way that private individuals and organizations do.203 This aspect of
penalty reform requires attention: imposing a standard of conduct on govern-
ment officials that tracks the standards properly imposed on taxpayers and
tax practitioners is important, but applying a sanction mechanism that will
give government officials the proper incentives to conform their conduct to
that standard is much more difficult. In particular, the sanction mechanism
must be seen by taxpayers and tax practitioners as credible and effective so
that compliance with their own high standard of conduct does not unravel.
It may be that, as the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has
recommended, detailed publication by the government about how often it
200 See supra Part II.C.
201 Cf. JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 169 (recommending that standards of
conduct for government officials be “similar” to standards of conduct for tax practitioners).
202 See supra Part IV.A.2.
203 Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345 (2000).
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must make payments of costs to taxpayers and how large those payments are
would facilitate congressional oversight of the conduct of government offi-
cials.204 But just as individual officials seem unlikely to internalize the effect
of paying the taxpayer’s costs out of the fisc, so too they seem unlikely to
internalize the effects of possible adverse publicity and increased legislative
scrutiny resulting from publication of those payments. To be meaningful—
and to be understood by taxpayers and tax practitioners as meaningful—
sanctions against government officials for failing to meet the standards of
conduct required of them must affect the tenure and promotion of those offi-
cials. If government officials know that non-compliance with the applicable
standards of conduct will adversely affect their prospects for remaining in
government service and advancing to positions of higher responsibility and
better compensation, they are considerably more likely to take those stan-
dards seriously in their dealings with taxpayers and tax practitioners.205 Still,
the potential for over-deterring government officials would need to be con-
sidered carefully; making government officials too cautious about challeng-
ing taxpayer self-assessments might cause tax administration to unravel from
the other side.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the relationship between tax penalties and
tax compliance. The legal and economics literatures conventionally assume
that the relationship is purely instrumental: the function of tax penalties is
solely to support tax compliance. On this understanding of the relationship,
the robust tax compliance observed in the United States presents a deep and
persistent puzzle. The deterrence model, which assumes that taxpayers are
amoral, rational actors, cannot match the weak expected penalties of current
law to the high levels of taxpayer compliance. The norms model, which sup-
plements the deterrence story by appealing to social and personal tax-com-
pliance norms, does little more than posit a black box of taxpayer
motivations. Still, these two models no doubt account for an appreciable
level of taxpayer compliance, even if they do not account for all of it. There
is good reason, then, to take note of the deficiencies that these models iden-
tify in the existing penalty structures.
This Article has identified and examined another aspect of the relation-
ship between tax penalties and tax compliance—one that generally has been
overlooked by the existing literature. Tax penalties not only support tax com-
pliance, they also define it. Tax penalties determine the standards of conduct
that the law imposes on taxpayers; they distinguish compliant taxpayers
from non-compliant taxpayers. Importantly, the idea of tax compliance in a
204 See JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 12, at 171.
205 It seems that such a system of sanctions could be administered more effectively by an
inspector general than by the IRS itself.
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self-assessment system can consist only in the taxpayer making her best ef-
forts to assess and report her correct tax liabilities. The policy commitment
to a self-assessment tax system assumes that taxpayers can and should be
trusted to make correct assessments and reports to the government; other-
wise, the efficiency and political justifications for having a self-assessment
system crumble. But the penalties provided under current law generally set
much lower standards of conduct. In the case of non-abusive transactions,
current law only requires that the taxpayer base her self-assessment on a
good-enough-but-wrong legal position. Even for most abusive transactions,
the taxpayer only needs a reasonable belief that her position is more likely
than not to prevail.
Both the definitional and the instrumental functions of tax penalties
unambiguously imply that existing penalties should be reformed. Because
the definitional function is the more basic of the two, it must be the first
consideration. Properly defining tax compliance for a self-assessment system
requires that taxpayers be held to a standard of assessing and reporting their
liabilities only on the basis of legal positions that they reasonably and in
good faith believe to be correct. This high standard demands that taxpayers
fulfill their obligations with the overriding objective of accuracy. It specifi-
cally rejects the treatment of the tax return as a litigating document, yet it
also rejects the unforgiving standard of strict liability for taxpayer error. Po-
sitions disclosed by taxpayers on their returns should at least satisfy the
more-likely-than-not standard.
Additionally, the standard of conduct for tax practitioners should reflect
the standard of conduct for taxpayers. Whether they serve as advisors, return
preparers, or promoters of transactions, the conduct of practitioners should
support the taxpayer’s compliance with her obligation to assess and report
correctly. Similarly, government officials who review and reassess a tax-
payer’s self-assessment should be required to act under the same standard
that applies to taxpayers for disclosed positions. Because current law fails to
impose these standards of conduct, reform is needed for the standards appli-
cable both to tax practitioners and to government officials (although, as
noted, the instrumental implications of reform to the standards for govern-
ment officials require particular attention).
The penalty reform considerations presented by the deterrence and
norms models of tax compliance remain important. A system of tax penalties
that properly defines tax compliance but that does not effectively promote
that compliance will have largely symbolic value. On the other hand, a sys-
tem of tax penalties that effectively promotes taxpayer conduct not measur-
ing up to the proper idea of tax compliance is pointless. Both aspects of tax
penalty reform are necessary, and responsible reform ultimately must ac-
count for both the definitional and instrumental functions. Between the two,
however, the definitional function is logically and practically the initial step;
reforming penalties to define the proper idea of tax compliance should be the
first, but not the last, concern of legislative action.

